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ARTICLE 
PARTISAN BALANCE WITH BITE 
Brian D. Feinstein* & Daniel J. Hemel** 
Dozens of multimember agencies across the federal government are 
subject to partisan balance requirements, which mandate that no more 
than a simple majority of agency members may hail from a single party. 
Administrative law scholars and political scientists have questioned 
whether these provisions meaningfully affect the ideological composition 
of federal agencies. In theory, Presidents can comply with these require-
ments by appointing ideologically sympathetic members of the opposite 
party once they have filled their quota of same-party appointees (i.e., a 
Democratic President can appoint liberal Republicans or a Republican 
President can appoint conservative Democrats). No multiagency study 
in the past fifty years, however, has examined whether—in practice—
partisan balance requirements actually prevent Presidents from 
selecting like-minded individuals for cross-party appointments. 
This Article fills that gap. We gather data on 578 appointees to 
twenty-three agencies over the course of six presidencies and thirty-six 
years. We identify the estimated ideological preferences of those 
appointees based on personal campaign contributions. We then compare 
the ideological preferences of co-party and cross-party appointees across 
agencies and across presidencies. The analysis indicates that partisan 
balance requirements had at most a modest impact on the ideological 
composition of multimember agencies from the late 1970s to the early 
1990s but a stronger effect from the mid-1990s onward. This Article 
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considers several possible explanations for these findings. The results 
are consistent with a story of “partisan sort”: As ideology and party 
affiliation have become more tightly linked, cross-party appointees have 
become more likely to share the ideological preferences of their co-
partisans rather than those of the appointing President. The findings 
suggest that the increasing polarization of political parties is 
contributing to a concomitant increase in the ideological heterogeneity 
of multimember agencies subject to partisan balance mandates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Partisan balance requirements (PBRs) are a common—and 
controversial—feature of federal agency design. These provisions 
generally mandate that only a bare majority of commissioners of a 
multimember agency can hail from the same political party. More than 
half of all multimember agencies within the federal government are now 
subject to these party-balance rules, ranging from little-known entities 
like the African Development Foundation to high-profile agencies such 
as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).1 Yet, despite the prevalence of PBRs, 
scholars of administrative law lack even a basic understanding of how 
these mandates affect the ideological composition and policy outputs of 
multimember agencies. This Article sheds light on PBRs and their 
consequences. 
A number of commentators have doubted whether PBRs materially 
affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies. They point 
out that Presidents can comply with the letter of the law simply by 
selecting an appointee who is nominally registered as a member of the 
opposite party or as an independent, even if that individual is otherwise 
the President’s ideological ally. This view was perhaps most clearly stated 
in a 1976 report commissioned by the Senate Commerce Committee, 
which averred that neither Republican nor Democratic Presidents had 
chosen “‘bona fide, honest-to-God’ members of the other party” to fill 
cross-party seats.2   
Until scholars can determine empirically whether PBRs 
meaningfully constrain a President’s ability to appoint ideologically 
sympathetic commissioners to multimember agencies, it will be difficult 
to say much about the positive or normative implications of these 
statutory requirements. And yet, in the last half century, not a single 
academic article has systematically examined whether and how PBRs 
affect the ideological composition of the agencies to which they apply. 
One study has sought to measure the effect of partisan balance on voting 
patterns at the FCC specifically,3 and a handful of scholars have offered 
                                                                                                                                
 1. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and 
Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L. Rev. 769, 797 tbl.4 (2013). 
 2. Staff of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., Appointments to the 
Regulatory Agencies: The Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade 
Commission (1949–1974), at 386 (Comm. Print 1976). 
 3. Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan 
Requirements on Regulation 1–3 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://perma.cc/F8MW-6WN8 (“[T]he effect of commissioner ideology on voting is 
profound. Commissioner partisan affiliation exhibits robust and large predictive power 
over votes, even holding constant the party of the appointing president.”); see also 
Wenmouth Williams, Jr., Impact of Commissioner Background on FCC Decisions: 1962–
1975, 20 J. Broadcasting 239, 241 (1976) (providing an earlier look at FCC voting patterns 
based on political affiliation). 
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anecdotal observations that speak to this question.4 But for the last 
systematic, cross-agency empirical analysis of PBRs’ effect on agencies’ 
ideological composition, one has to look all the way back to a 1964 study 
by political scientists Stuart Nagel and Martin Lubin.5 
A lot has changed since 1964. Back then, both major political parties 
were ideological “big tents”: The Democratic Party included a staunchly 
conservative southern base, which found itself to the right of 
“Rockefeller Republicans” from the North on several major issues.6 By 
the turn of the twenty-first century, however, partisan identity had 
become a much more reliable predictor of ideology—a phenomenon 
known as “partisan sort.”7 Meanwhile, developments in campaign 
finance law, information technology, and empirical social science have 
made individual ideology much easier to observe. The Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 for the first time required candidates and political 
parties to disclose the identities of their contributors as well as the 
amounts donated.8 Those records have been open to the public in a 
computer-searchable form since 1980,9 and they have been posted on the 
Internet in a searchable format since 1998.10 While an individual’s 
campaign contributions are not a perfect proxy for ideology, recent 
political science research suggests that donations closely track ideological 
preferences.11 By leveraging information on campaign contributions 
made by individuals across several election cycles, researchers can 
                                                                                                                                
 4. See infra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 5. Stuart Nagel & Martin Lubin, Regulatory Commissioners and Party Politics, 17 
Admin. L. Rev. 39 (1964) (studying the influence of party affiliation on the 
decisionmaking of seven regulatory agencies). 
 6. See Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and 
Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal, 19 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 1, 1–2 (2005) (describing 
how southern congressional Democrats, who had previously aligned with northern 
Democrats, came to align with Republicans on labor issues in the 1940s); Eric Schickler, 
Kathryn Pearson & Brian D. Feinstein, Congressional Parties and Civil Rights Politics from 
1933 to 1972, 72 J. Pol. 672, 672–73 (2010) (describing how northern Democrats took the 
lead on advancing civil rights legislation beginning in the 1940s, with Republicans in the 
middle—offering tepid support and occasional behind-the-scenes opposition—and with 
southern Democrats firmly opposed). 
 7. See Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats 
and Conservatives Became Republicans 2–11 (2009) (defining the term “partisan sort”). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 92-225, §§ 304, 308(a)(4), 86 Stat. 3, 14–15, 17 (1972). 
 9. Telephone Interview with Senior Pub. Affairs Specialist, Pub. Records Branch, 
FEC (May 30, 2017) (call notes on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also 49 Fed. Reg. 
22,335, 22,336 (May 29, 1984) (setting fees for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests concerning “computer search[es] of an entire individual contributor file for 
contributions made by a particular individual or individuals”). 
 10. Press Release, FEC, FEC Launches New Web Info (July 21, 1998), 
http://classic.fec.gov/press/press1998/websrch.htm [http://perma.cc/RA8G-EAAW]. 
The FEC first made “comprehensive computer files containing campaign finance 
information” available online in 1996 and introduced a search function two years later. Id. 
 11. See Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 367 
(2014) [hereinafter Bonica, Ideological Marketplace]. 
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distinguish among liberals, moderates, and conservatives within the same 
political party—both those who hold government office and those who 
don’t—in a much more reliable way than past generations of scholars 
possibly could. 
All this means that a comprehensive, cross-agency empirical analysis 
of the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember 
boards and commissions is long overdue. This Article fills that void. 
Before delving into the analysis, this Article considers two explanations as 
to why limitations on the partisan composition of agencies might affect 
the ideological composition of multimember agencies: a supply-side theory 
and a demand-side theory. (It also considers alternative theories that 
focus on search costs and identity signaling.) The supply-side theory 
posits that there is only a small pool of liberal Republicans and 
conservative Democrats who are potentially qualified to serve as 
commissioners, and so Presidents looking for competent cross-party 
appointees whose ideological preferences track their own will often find 
themselves out of luck. Thus, Presidents who are required by PBRs to 
make cross-party appointments to multimember agencies will be 
compelled by supply-side constraints to choose a genuine cross-partisan. 
Whereas the supply-side theory focuses on the first stage of the 
appointment process—the selection of a nominee—the demand-side 
theory focuses on the end stage: confirmation. The demand-side theory 
emphasizes that nominees to federal agencies ultimately must be “sold” 
to the Senate, since a majority vote of the Senate is necessary for 
confirmation. On this view, consumers in the confirmation market 
(senators) demand cross-party appointees who are bona fide members of 
that party and thus force the President to choose commissioners from 
the other side of the ideological spectrum. 
The supply-side and demand-side theories both suggest that PBRs 
will affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies, but 
they generate different predictions as to when and why. If the supply-side 
theory is correct, then we would expect to see the effect of PBRs growing 
over time in tandem with partisan sort. If the demand-side theory is 
correct, then we would expect to see the effect of PBRs most strongly in 
periods of divided government, when the opposition party in the Senate 
has leverage to force the President’s hand. 
To assess the effect of PBRs and test these and other theories, we 
gather data on the identities of 578 appointees to twenty-three agencies 
over the course of six presidencies and thirty-six years (1979 through 
2014). We then use data on those individuals’ campaign contributions to 
estimate their ideological preferences. We compare the (estimated) ideo-
logical preferences of appointees to those of their appointing Presidents, 
and we compare co-party appointees (i.e., a Democrat appointed by a 
Democratic President or a Republican appointed by a Republican 
President) to cross-party appointees (i.e., a Republican appointed by a 
Democratic President or vice versa). We show how the effects of PBRs on 
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the ideological composition of federal agencies vary over time and with 
changes in control of Congress. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that partisan balance 
requirements do “bite.” When Presidents are required by law to make 
cross-party appointments, they generally choose “bona fide, honest-to-
God” members of the opposite party—or, at least, individuals whose 
observed ideologies are significantly different from the President’s own. 
Looking at the thirty-six-year period overall, Republican Presidents 
appoint Democrats who are more liberal than they are and more liberal 
than their Republican co-party appointees are. Likewise, Democratic 
Presidents appoint Republicans who are more conservative than they and 
their Democratic co-party appointees are.  
Second, the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multi-
member agencies is much more pronounced today than it was at the 
beginning of our study period. This finding is consistent with the supply-
side theory and our expectations based on partisan sort. President Jimmy 
Carter often named relatively moderate Republicans as cross-party 
appointees; Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush often 
appointed centrist or conservative Democrats. By the time President Bill 
Clinton took office, however, this phenomenon had subsided. 
Republicans appointed by Presidents Clinton and Obama tended to be 
quite conservative, and Democrats appointed by President George W. 
Bush tended to be quite liberal. 
Third, we find no apparent relationship between the presence or ab-
sence of divided government and the ideological distance between the 
President and cross-party appointees. This finding is at odds with the 
demand-side theory, which would lead us to expect the effect to be most 
pronounced when the White House and the Senate are controlled by dif-
ferent parties. While we do not dismiss the demand-side explanation 
entirely, our analysis suggests that supply-side factors do more to mediate 
the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of multimember 
agencies. 
This Article concludes by considering the implications of our empiri-
cal analysis for the scholarly understanding of PBRs. It identifies three 
main accounts of partisan balance requirements in the administrative law 
literature. One account, which pulls insights from political science, posits 
that PBRs reduce the costs borne by Congress in monitoring agency ac-
tions (the monitoring account). On this view, PBRs ensure that agencies in-
clude members whose policy preferences diverge from the sitting 
President’s, and these minority members will alert lawmakers if members 
from the President’s party stray from legislators’ preferences.12 A second 
account, drawing on social psychology literature, suggests that PBRs can 
improve agencies’ deliberative processes by offsetting tendencies toward 
                                                                                                                                
 12. See infra section III.A. 
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group polarization (the deliberation account).13 According to this view, 
PBRs ensure that multimember agencies include a diverse set of 
perspectives, thereby counterbalancing tendencies toward group 
polarization. Apart from any effect on the cost of congressional 
monitoring, this account suggests that PBRs can improve federal 
administration by raising the quality of agency decisionmaking.14 A third 
account, rooted in constitutional law scholarship on the “unitary 
executive,” posits that PBRs obstruct the President in the execution of 
her constitutional responsibilities (the obstruction account).15 According to 
this view, PBRs “quite literally force Presidents to rely on political 
enemies to carry out their executive duties,”16 and thus potentially 
prevent Presidents from implementing their policy agendas.17 
These three accounts are not mutually exclusive: In theory, PBRs 
could reduce the cost to Congress of monitoring multimember agencies, 
counterbalance tendencies toward group polarization within agencies, 
and force Presidents to rely on their political enemies. Moreover, these 
three perspectives on PBRs all rest on the same empirical premise: that 
PBRs actually operate as meaningful constraints on the President’s ability 
to appoint commissioners who share her ideology and policy 
preferences. Our findings shore up that empirical premise, though they 
fall short of confirming the more ambitious claims that each account 
makes. Our analysis also indicates that the effects of PBRs on the 
operation of multimember agencies are potentially quite different today 
than they were three decades ago, when PBRs had a less dramatic effect 
on ideological composition. This finding suggests that conclusions 
regarding PBRs drawn from the period before partisan sort should be 
reassessed anew. Finally, and perhaps counterintuitively, this Article 
suggests that, despite concerns that PBRs weaken presidential control 
over multimember agencies, the fact that PBRs are relatively effective 
actually makes them less threatening to the sitting President. The 
rationale for this counterintuitive conclusion is explained at greater 
length below.18 
                                                                                                                                
 13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 
Yale L.J. 71, 74 (2000) (defining group polarization as involving “members of a 
deliberating group predictably mov[ing] toward a more extreme point in the direction 
indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies”). 
 14. See infra section III.B. 
 15. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Johnjerica Hodge & Wesley W. Wintermyer, 
Partisan Balance Requirements in the Age of New Formalism, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 941, 
991–99 (2015) (“Although statutory partisan balance requirements may appear innocuous 
or even beneficial at first glance, these provisions have far-reaching ramifications on the 
President’s ability to properly influence and oversee federal agencies.”). 
 16. Id. at 991. 
 17. Id. at 995. 
 18. In brief, PBRs ensure that Presidents inherit commissions with only a bare 
majority of members from the opposition party. For a commission with fixed terms for 
appointees and a PBR, this means that in expectation, it will take less time for a new 
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For the optimist, our results might suggest that there is an 
unexpected upside to partisan sort: As the parties become less 
ideologically diverse, multimember agencies become more so. While the 
phenomenon of partisan sort has fueled concerns about group 
polarization in government institutions,19 our results suggest that the 
combination of partisan sort and partisan balance requirements 
improves the prospects for ideological diversity within multimember 
agencies. We caution, though, that sweeping normative conclusions are 
premature: Our study addresses the effect of PBRs on the ideological 
diversity of multimember agencies, not the effect of ideological diversity 
on agency functioning. We cannot yet claim that PBRs are desirable 
because ideologically diverse agencies function better than agencies with 
monolithic memberships. What we can say is that for such a claim to be 
true, it must first be true that PBRs actually lead to more ideologically 
diverse agencies, and our results strongly affirm that first premise. 
While our study is primarily backward-looking, our findings have 
clear implications going forward for the evaluation of cross-party 
appointments under President Trump and subsequent administrations. 
Without knowing whether past Presidents have named genuine cross-
partisans to PBR agencies, it is difficult to determine whether a new 
White House occupant is acting consistent with established norms. At the 
same time, a President can potentially skew the composition of PBR 
agencies by quickly making co-party appointments while stalling on 
cross-party nominations. However, by documenting past practices 
regarding appointments to PBR agencies, this study establishes a baseline 
that can facilitate future comparative evaluations. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on 
PBRs, reviews the existing literature on these requirements, and 
considers causal pathways by which these requirements might affect the 
ideological composition of multimember agencies. Part II describes our 
data and methodology and presents our main empirical results. Part III 
discusses the implications of our results and identifies areas for future 
research. 
                                                                                                                                
President to “flip” the commission to include a majority of her party’s members than it 
would for an otherwise identical multimember commission with a fixed-term provision 
and no PBR. See infra section III.C. 
 19. See David A. Jones, The Polarizing Effect of a Partisan Workplace, 46 PS: Pol. Sci. 
& Pol. 67, 69–71 & figs.3 & 4 (2013) (reporting evidence of group polarization at federal 
and other inside-the-Beltway workplaces); see also James B. Stewart, Case Study in Chaos: 
How Management Experts Grade a Trump White House, N.Y. Times (Feb. 2, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/business/donald-trump-management-style.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting a management expert’s concerns 
regarding “group think” in the Trump Administration). 
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I. PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND EXISTING 
EVIDENCE 
This first Part provides an overview of partisan balance requirements 
in agency organic statutes and considers reasons why these requirements 
might (or might not) affect the ideological makeup of boards and com-
missions. Section I.A briefly summarizes the history of PBRs. Section I.B 
surveys the literature on the efficacy of PBRs. Section I.C considers causal 
pathways through which PBRs might operate and explains how these 
different causal stories can be disentangled. 
A. A Short History of Partisan Balance Requirements 
Partisan balance requirements for federal agencies date at least as 
far back as the Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882.20 The Act prohibited 
polygamists from voting or running in Utah elections. A new Utah 
Commission was tasked with enforcing the anti-polygamy requirements. 
Section 9 of the Act stated that the Board should consist of “five persons, 
to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, not more than three of whom shall be members of one political 
party . . . .”21 Similar PBRs appeared in several more nineteenth-century 
statutes, including the Pendleton Act of 1883, which created the Civil 
Service Commission; 22 the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which cre-
ated the Interstate Commerce Commission; 23 and an 1890 law 
establishing a nine-member board of general appraisers that would 
ascertain the value of merchandise for customs purposes.24 Congress also 
included PBRs in a number of statutes creating commissions to negotiate 
treaties with Native American tribes at the century’s end.25 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the 1880s also saw a national movement for civil service 
reform, and these first PBRs limited the President’s ability to adopt a “to 
the victor go the spoils” posture in appointments.26 Yet these first few 
PBRs do not appear to have elicited much discussion in the House or in 
                                                                                                                                
 20. Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30; see also Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, 
at 964. 
 21. § 9, 22 Stat. at 32 (emphasis added). 
 22. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403; see also Krotoszynski et al., supra note 
15, at 966. 
 23. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. 
 24. Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136. 
 25. See Act of June 10, 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 342; Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 164, 
27 Stat. 120, 138–39; Act of Aug. 19, 1890, ch. 807, 26 Stat. 336, 354; Act of Mar. 2, 1889, 
ch. 412, § 14, 25 Stat. 980, 1005. Justice Brandeis documents the early history of PBRs in 
his dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 269–71 & n.51 (1926) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 26. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the 
Gilded Age, 119 Yale L.J. 1362, 1389 (2010). 
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the Senate, and—speculation aside—the initial reason for their insertion 
remains obscure.27 
The presidency of Woodrow Wilson brought with it the next golden 
age of PBRs. Wilson’s first term saw the creation of five major 
multimember agencies with PBRs in their organic statutes: the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC),28 the Federal Farm Loan Board,29 the U.S. 
Shipping Board,30 the U.S. Employees’ Compensation Commission,31 and 
the U.S. Tariff Commission.32 At the time, senators suggested that PBRs 
would make agencies less prone to partisan bias and more likely to act on 
the basis of expertise—though precisely how PBRs might produce these 
results remained unspecified.33 
The creation of new agencies with PBRs in their organic statutes has 
continued ever since. In the last century, Congress has established at 
least forty bodies subject to PBRs.34 Most of these statutes provide for an 
odd number of members, no more than a bare majority of whom may be 
from the same political party.35 The organic statutes of a small handful of 
agencies (most significantly, the Federal Election Commission (FEC)) 
provide for an even number of members, with no more than half from 
the same party.36 
Significantly, the PBR provisions in agency organic statutes do not 
technically require a Democratic President to appoint Republicans or a 
Republican President to appoint Democrats. For example, the Equal 
                                                                                                                                
 27. See Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 964–65, 967. 
 28. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 718 (providing that “[n]ot more 
than three of the [appointed] commissioners shall be members of the same political 
party”). 
 29. Act of July 17, 1916, ch. 245, § 3, 39 Stat. 360, 360 (“Of the four members to be 
appointed by the President, not more than two shall be appointed from one political 
party.”). 
 30. Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 451, § 3, 39 Stat. 728, 729 (“Not more than three of the 
commissioners shall be appointed from the same political party.”). 
 31. Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458, § 28, 39 Stat. 742, 748 (“No more than two of [the 
appointed] commissioners shall be members of the same political party.”). 
 32. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795 (providing that there will be 
“six members, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of Senate, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same political 
party”). 
 33. See Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 969–70 (discussing Congress’s rationale 
for creating PBRs). 
 34. See id. at 1009–15 tbl.1, 1016 tbl.2, 1017 tbl.3. 
 35. Id. (noting the partisan membership requirements for independent agencies 
listed in the tables). 
 36. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 
sec. 1, § 101, 90 Stat. 475, 475 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2012)). 
Other extant agencies with an even number of members and a requirement that no more 
than half hail from the same party include the International Trade Commission, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1330(a) (2012), and the Election Assistance Commission, 52 U.S.C. § 20923(b)(2) 
(Supp. II 2015). 
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Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) organic statute states 
that “not more than three [of the five commissioners] shall be members 
of the same political party.”37 Thus, a Republican President could 
appoint three Republican commissioners and two independents (or, for 
that matter, two libertarians), rather than naming two Democrats. In 
practice, though, we see very few cases of Presidents naming 
independents to cross-party posts on PBR agencies. Indeed, in our review 
of 216 cross-party appointments to twenty-three PBR agencies between 
1979 and 2014, we have identified only seven cases in which a President 
named an independent at a time when a PBR prohibited him from 
appointing a member of his own party to an agency.38 
These seven cases, moreover, do not suggest a pattern of Presidents 
attempting to manipulate PBRs by filling cross-party seats with like-
minded independents. Three of the seven cases involved a Democratic 
President filling a cross-party seat with an appointee who, though 
registered as an independent, had previously worked as an aide to a 
Republican senator.39 Two more involved Republican Presidents filling 
cross-party seats with independents who would later be chosen by 
Democratic Presidents for positions to which the Democratic President 
could have named a Democrat—an indication that the individual, 
though registered as an independent, was generally aligned with the 
Democratic Party.40 One case involved President Clinton appointing to 
                                                                                                                                
 37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2012). 
 38. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 39. The three are: Don Zimmerman, appointed by President Carter to the NLRB in 
1980; Reginald Jones, appointed by President Clinton to the EEOC in 1996; and Jackie 
Clegg, appointed by Clinton to the Export-Import Bank in 1997. See James A. Gross, 
Broken Promise: The Subversion of U.S. Labor Relations Policy, 1947–1994, at 245–46 
(1995) (noting that Zimmerman had served as an adviser to Republican Senator Jacob 
Javits of New York); Lee Davidson, Utah Nominee Gets High Marks, Deseret News (Salt 
Lake City) (May 23, 1997), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/562187/Utah-nominee-gets-
high-marks.html [http://perma.cc/DUE5-UMHA] (noting that Clegg had served as an 
aide to Republican Senator Jake Garn of Utah); Press Release, White House Office of the 
Press Sec’y, President Clinton Names Reginald E. Jones to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (June 5, 1996), http://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/ 
1996/06/1996-06-06-jones-on-equal-employment-opportunity-commission.html [http:// 
perma.cc/87C9-QDYT] (noting that Jones, at the time of his appointment, was senior 
legislative counsel to then-Republican Senator James Jeffords of Vermont). 
 40. The two are: Mary Schapiro, appointed by President Reagan to the SEC in 1988 
and reappointed by President George H.W. Bush in 1989, and Thomas Curry, appointed 
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) by President George W. Bush in 
2003. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Official from F.D.I.C. Picked to Lead Banking Regulator, 
N.Y. Times (July 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/business/ 
02currency.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting President Obama’s 
nomination of Curry to be Comptroller of the Currency, a position not subject to a 
PBR); Hannah Bergman, FDIC Board Is Factor in OCC Choice, Am. Banker (Jan. 12, 2005), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/fdic-board-is-factor-in-occ-choice (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (noting that Curry was an independent named by President 
George W. Bush to a cross-party seat); Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Clinton Expected to Name 
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the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) an independent who 
had been recommended by the Board’s outgoing Republican member.41 
Indeed, in only one case did we find any record of complaints that the 
President had appointed an independent rather than a member of the 
opposite party to fill a cross-party seat.42 
The only agency at which Presidents have repeatedly sought to fill 
cross-party seats with ideologically sympathetic independents is—perhaps 
surprisingly—an agency with no regulatory authority: the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights.43 (We exclude the Commission on Civil 
Rights from our dataset because of its lack of authority to bind others 
through regulation, adjudication, or enforcement, as well as the fact that 
half of its members are chosen by Congress rather than the President 
                                                                                                                                
S.E.C. Member to Head C.F.T.C., N.Y. Times (May 3, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/ 
05/03/business/clinton-expected-to-name-sec-member-to-head-cftc.html (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that President Clinton would name Schapiro to chair 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) at a time when the commission 
already had two Republican members, meaning Clinton could have named a fellow 
Democrat); Kathleen Pender, Mary Schapiro’s Mixed Marks as SEC Head, S.F. Chron. (Nov. 
26, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Mary-Schapiro-s-mixed-
marks-as-SEC-head-4068463.php [http://perma.cc/9LBY-75RP] (noting that Schapiro, 
named by President Obama in 2009 to chair the SEC, served with two Republicans, 
meaning that Obama could have named a third registered Democrat instead of Schapiro); 
Vicky Stamas, President to Nominate Reum to Fill Position Remaining at the SEC, Bond 
Buyer, Aug. 21, 1992, at 5 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that Schapiro was 
an independent in a cross-party seat). 
 41. President Clinton appointed John Goglia to the NTSB in 1995 and reappointed 
him in 1999. See Matthew Brelis, US Transportation Appointee Brings Hands-On View; 29 
Years as Air Mechanic Won Spot for Saugus Man, Bos. Globe, Oct. 10, 1995, at 18 (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review); The Former Board of the NTSB, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 
http://www.ntsb.gov/about/board/Pages/former_members.aspx [http://perma.cc/2FPY-
ZG4H] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017) (noting that Goglia served on the NTSB from 1995 to 
2004). 
 42. President Reagan named Mary Azcuenaga to the FTC in 1984. Her appointment 
generated grumbling from one Democratic senator who “wondered why Mr. Reagan, if he 
wants to appoint independents, cannot pick them for Republican seats.” Robert D. 
Hershey, Jr., Washington Watch; No Democrats Seen for F.T.C., N.Y. Times (Oct. 28, 
1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/28/business/washington-watch-no-democrats-
seen-for-ftc.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (paraphrasing Senator Wendell 
Ford, a Democrat from Kentucky). However, the outgoing Democratic commissioner was 
reported to favorably view Azcuenaga, who replaced him. See Thomas Ferraro, Reagan 
Expected to Name Woman to Replace FTC’s Pertschuk, UPI (Aug. 14, 1984), 
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/08/14/Reagan-expected-to-name-woman-to-
replace-FTCs-Pertschuk/9862461304000 [http://perma.cc/A7SA-GSHN] (quoting an 
aide to the outgoing Democratic commissioner who said that the commissioner “respects” 
Azcuenaga and was “relatively pleased” that she would be his successor). 
 43. See Charlie Savage, Maneuver Gave Bush a Conservative Rights Panel, Bos. 
Globe (Nov. 6, 2007), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/11/06/ 
maneuver_gave_bush_a_conservative_rights_panel/?page=full [http://perma.cc/57GP-
FE7N] (“Especially since the 1980s, presidents and lawmakers have tried to tilt the panel 
by appointing independents who shared their party’s views on civil rights.”). 
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and its members generally serve part-time.44) The Commission’s organic 
statute states that “[n]ot more than 4 of the [8] members shall at any one 
time be of the same political party.”45 The meaning of this provision was 
tested in 2003 and 2004, when two Republican members of the 
Commission changed their registration to independent.46 Their switches 
allowed President George W. Bush to name two additional Republicans 
to the commission, bringing the number of Republican or recently 
Republican members of the panel to six.47 At the time, the Office of 
Legal Counsel in the Justice Department issued an opinion stating that, 
for purposes of the statutory PBR, “the relevant consideration is the party 
affiliation of the other members at the time the new member is 
appointed.”48 In the Office of Legal Counsel’s view, application of the 
statutory PBR did not require looking beyond party registration to 
determine the partisan identity of a prospective or current 
commissioner. 
Aside from the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion, there is very little 
legal precedent regarding the interpretation or application of partisan 
balance requirements in agency organic statutes. The constitutionality of 
PBRs has been challenged in two cases, but the courts did not reach the 
merits of the constitutional issue in either case. In FEC v. NRA Political 
Victory Fund, the National Rifle Association’s political action committee 
argued that the provision in the six-member FEC’s organic statute 
capping the number of commissioners from any political party at three 
violated the President’s appointment power.49 The D.C. Circuit rejected 
the argument on standing grounds, reasoning that “it is impossible to 
determine in this case whether the statute actually limited the President’s 
appointment power” because it was not clear that the President 
otherwise would have sought to appoint more than three commissioners 
from his own party.50 In National Committee of the Reform Party v. Democratic 
National Committee, the Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the FEC’s 
partisan balance requirement on similar grounds, emphasizing that 
                                                                                                                                
 44. Of the Commission’s eight members, four are appointed by the President, two 
are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate on the recommendation of the 
Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, and two are appointed by the Speaker of the House 
on the recommendation of the House Majority and Minority Leaders. 42 U.S.C. § 1975(b) 
(2012). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Savage, supra note 43 (“Critics say Bush in effect installed a fifth and sixth 
Republican on the panel in December 2004, after two commissioners, both Republicans 
when appointed, reregistered as independents.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Political Balance Requirement for the Civil Rights Comm’n, 28 Op. O.L.C. 295, 
295 (2004). 
 49. 6 F.3d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 50. Id. 
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“without the statute the President could have appointed exactly the same 
members.”51 
We know of no case in which a litigant has sought judicial 
enforcement of a PBR—that is, has argued for the invalidation of an 
agency action on the grounds that a commission had too many members 
of the same party. At the same time, we have found no reported instances 
of outright PBR violations—no case, that is, in which a President has 
sought to exceed the statutory cap on commissioners from a single party. 
The letter, if not the spirit, of PBRs is followed uniformly. But to say that 
PBRs are followed as a technical matter does not explain what substantive 
effects these provisions have. The following section turns to that question 
and surveys the scant scholarly literature that exists to date. 
B. Do Partisan Balance Requirements Bite? 
Our central aim is to test the hypothesis that partisan balance 
requirements affect the ideological composition of multimember 
agencies. A contrary view posits that cross-party commissioners “come in 
sheep’s clothing” and do not differ from a President’s co-party 
appointees in any way other than the superficial fact of party 
registration.52 One scholar has noted the example of Ray Wakefield, a 
nominally Republican but questionably conservative Roosevelt nominee 
to the FCC.53 Timothy Nokken and Brian Sala cite examples from the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter Administrations.54 An 
                                                                                                                                
 51. 168 F.3d 360, 365 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d at 825). 
 52. See Ho, supra note 3, at 2–3 (collecting sources that make this claim). 
 53. See Lawrence W. Lichty, Members of the Federal Radio Commission and Federal 
Communications Commission 1927–1961, 6 J. Broadcasting 23, 25 (1961); accord 
Williams, supra note 3, at 241 (concluding that “party affiliation has not been a reliable 
predictor of voting” on the FCC). 
 54. Timothy P. Nokken & Brian R. Sala, Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of 
Presidential Appointments to Independent Agencies, 12 J. Theoretical Pol. 91, 95 (2000). 
In particular, Nokken and Sala note that President Eisenhower appointed two nominally 
Democratic FTC commissioners whose ideological loyalties were suspect: Robert Secrest, a 
conservative Democratic congressman from Ohio, and William Kern, previously an FTC 
staff member “whose principal Democratic credentials were that his father had been 
William Jennings Bryan’s running mate in 1908.” Id. (quoting Staff of the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 94th Cong., Appointments to the Regulatory Agencies: The Federal 
Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission (1949–1974), at 385 
(Comm. Print 1976)). Nokken and Sala add that “Kennedy and Nixon adopted similar 
appointment strategies by appointing liberal ‘Lindsay Republicans’ and conservative 
‘Connally Democrats,’ respectively.” Id. And they further mention the case of Frank 
Reiche, one of President Carter’s cross-party appointees to the FEC, whom some 
Republican senators opposed because he was not sufficiently conservative. Id. at 95 & n.6; 
see also Princeton Attorney Confirmed to Post on Election Panel, Asbury Park Press, July 
26, 1979, at 62 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that twenty-one out of forty-
one Republican senators voted against Reiche, with some conservative Republicans saying 
that he did not represent their views). 
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especially notorious example from the Nixon Administration is that of 
James Quello, a nominally cross-party appointee to the FCC who—
despite his Democratic affiliation—donated $1,100 to Nixon’s reelection 
effort in 1972.55 A report commissioned by the Senate Commerce 
Committee and completed at the end of the Ford presidency concluded 
that cross-party appointees “typically” support the President who selected 
them.56 Alan Morrison observed at the end of the Reagan years that the 
outgoing President had “largely succeeded” in “placing in all agencies, 
independent and otherwise, those who believe firmly in the Reagan view 
of government—Democrats as well as Republicans.”57 And Senator Bob 
Dole once accused President Clinton of appointing “Clinton 
Republicans” to cross-party seats.58 
We know of only one study other than our own that undertakes a 
quantitative cross-commission analysis of the effect of PBRs on the ideo-
logical composition of multimember agencies: the 1964 study by Stuart 
Nagel and Martin Lubin referenced above. Nagel and Lubin focus on 
seven commissions: the now-defunct Civil Aeronautics Board and 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the FCC, the Federal Power 
Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)), 
the FTC, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the SEC.59 
They draw data from three years each spaced a decade apart: 1936, 1946, 
and 1956.60 They consider a decision to be “liberal” if it goes “in favor of 
the consumer, shipper, or investor (rather than the seller, producer, 
transporter, or broker), in favor of labor (rather than management), in 
favor of a small business or increased competition (rather than a larger 
firm or decreased competition).”61 They compare each commissioner’s 
liberalism score with her agency’s average liberalism score. On this 
dimension, Democrats appointed by Republican Presidents are most 
likely to be above their agency’s average liberalism score (64%), followed 
by Democrats appointed by Democratic Presidents (54%), followed by 
Republicans appointed by Democratic Presidents (46%), followed by 
Republicans appointed by Republican Presidents (33%).62 The findings 
are reported in a way that makes it impossible to determine just how 
                                                                                                                                
 55. See Staff of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., Appointments to the 
Regulatory Agencies: The Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade 
Commission (1949–1974), at 357 (Comm. Print 1976). 
 56. Id. at 366. 
 57. Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Regulatory Agencies?, 
1988 Duke L.J. 252, 253–54. 
 58. Al Kamen, Who’s Republican? And Who’s to Decide?, Wash. Post (Sept. 6, 1993), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/09/06/whos-republican-and-
whos-to-decide/8a85544f-f1a1-4558-ac1f-5c498e5609e6/?utm_term=.a10e33cb8cfe (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
 59. Nagel & Lubin, supra note 5, at 39. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 40. 
 62. Id. at 42 tbl.1. 
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much PBRs affect voting behavior, though the results seem to suggest 
that PBRs lead Republican Presidents to choose somewhat more liberal 
commissioners and lead Democratic Presidents to select somewhat more 
conservative commissioners. 
While these results are suggestive, Nagel and Lubin’s method of 
categorizing decisions as “liberal” and “conservative” is certainly 
vulnerable to critique. First, the terms “liberal” and “conservative” are 
not easy to operationalize—and any attempt to do so inevitably imports 
biases. (Why do we think liberals are more likely to favor “increased 
competition,” and how should we code cases in which the competitive 
consequences are hotly disputed?) Second, the types of cases that will 
reach an adjudicatory commission may vary with the commission’s 
ideological composition—the administrative law version of the Priest-
Klein effect familiar from the civil procedure literature.63 Individual 
workers and labor unions may be more likely to bring ambitious cases to 
the NLRB when they know that the Board has a liberal majority; likewise 
for employers when they know that the board tilts toward the right. 
Professor Daniel Ho’s methodologically rigorous study of voting 
patterns among FCC commissioners addresses the first of these two 
aforementioned imperfections of the Nagel and Lubin study. Ho 
pioneers an approach—a Bayesian multilevel ideal point model of mixed 
ordinal votes—to map votes onto a unidimensional spectrum without 
requiring researchers to decide which positions are “liberal” and which 
are “conservative.”64 As Ho summarizes, his analysis of the FCC suggests 
that most cross-party appointees are “genuine”: With a small number of 
exceptions, “[c]ross-party appointees don’t don sheep’s clothing.”65 In 
other words, Democratic commissioners appointed by Republican 
Presidents to satisfy the statutory PBR appear to be relatively liberal, and 
Republican commissioners appointed by Democratic Presidents to satisfy 
the statutory PBR appear to be relatively conservative. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the most conservative commissioner according to Ho’s 
estimates is a Republican appointed by Democratic President Clinton, 
and the three most liberal commissioners are Democrats appointed by 
Republican Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. 
Bush.66 
Ho’s study of the FCC provides us with extraordinarily useful 
insights regarding voting behavior at a single agency. But while Ho’s 
single-agency analysis suggests that partisan balance requirements do 
“bite,” it is not clear whether his FCC-specific results are generalizable to 
                                                                                                                                
 63. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 14–18 (1984) (suggesting the disputes that reach litigation are ones in 
which each party has close to a 50% probability of victory). 
 64. Ho, supra note 3, at 14–16. 
 65. Id. at 19, 24. 
 66. Id. at 21 fig.4. 
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other multimember agencies.67 Unfortunately, Ho’s innovative method 
cannot be applied broadly beyond the FCC: His method relies on having 
a large set of nonunanimous commission votes to analyze, but at many 
multimember agencies—including the FEC, FTC, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC), and SEC—dissents and concurrences are rare.68 For 
this reason, we look to other data sources and methodological 
approaches in order to assess the cross-agency effects of PBRs. 
Ho’s study also does not seek to determine why PBRs might be effec-
tive. The next section turns to that question and sets forth two theories 
with testable implications that might explain the efficacy of these provi-
sions. Part II goes on to consider whether PBRs do in fact affect the ideo-
logical composition of multimember agencies and assess the evidence in 
support of the two separate theories. 
C. Why Might Partisan Balance Requirements Bite? 
We focus here on two causal mechanisms that might explain why 
PBRs affect the ideological composition of multimember agencies: a 
supply-side theory and a demand-side theory. In the “market” for 
commissioners, the President draws from a limited supply of individuals 
with the experience and expertise to serve competently on multimember 
federal agencies. The President then must “sell” the nominee to 
sometimes-skeptical senators—the consumers in our market metaphor. If 
PBRs do indeed affect the ideological composition of multimember 
agencies, it may be due to supply-side constraints, or demand-side 
constraints, or both. 
1. The Supply-Side Theory. — The supply-side theory holds that the 
President selects from a pool of potential cross-party appointees that is 
dominated by individuals whose ideological preferences differ from the 
President’s own. Consider the challenge facing a Democratic President 
who is filling a seat on the five-member FCC at a time when the FCC al-
ready has three Democratic members (its maximum number of same-
party commissioners). Presumably the President cares at least somewhat 
about the competence of commissioners and so desires an appointee 
                                                                                                                                
 67. The FCC is, by many accounts, a particularly politicized agency. See Benjamin 
Kapnik, Affirming the Status Quo?: The FCC, ALJs, and Agency Adjudications, 80 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1527, 1528 (2012) (“The FCC has long been considered a politicized 
agency . . . .”); Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of 
the Administrative State, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 675, 689 (2009) (noting the “super-
politicized” environment at the FCC); cf. Kimberly A. Zarkin & Michael J. Zarkin, The 
Federal Communications Commission: Front Line in the Culture and Regulation Wars 49 
(2006) (“[T]he FCC is an organization that is particularly open to interference by outside 
forces.”). While these characterizations are difficult to verify, they cast doubt on the 
external validity of FCC-specific findings. 
 68. See Ho, supra note 3, at 8 tbl.1 (showing that the number of dissents and 
concurrences per commissioner is 172 for the FCC, compared to four for the FEC, twelve 
for the FTC, three for the NRC, and six for the SEC). 
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with relevant experience in communications law or policy. The pool of 
individuals who have such experience and who are not members of the 
Democratic Party will be weighted toward moderates and conservatives. 
While it might not be impossible for the Democratic President to find a 
liberal non-Democrat who also has relevant qualifications for the 
commissionership, it is—at the very least—easier for a Democratic 
President to draw liberals from within the President’s own party than 
from without. 
The plausibility of the supply-side theory depends on the strength of 
the relationship between partisanship and ideology. If the Republican 
Party includes large pools of liberals as well as conservatives, then a 
Democratic President making a cross-party appointment can satisfy the 
PBR by selecting a relatively liberal Republican. Partisan sort, however, 
undermines the ability of Democratic Presidents to find ideologically 
sympathetic Republicans to fill posts on multimember agencies (and 
likewise for Republican Presidents seeking out ideologically sympathetic 
Democrats). 
The political science literature on partisan sort distinguishes 
between “elite polarization” and “mass polarization.” By “elites” (or 
alternatively, the “political class”), we refer to public officials, interest 
group leaders, activists, substantial donors, and political commentators.69 
While the extent to which mass polarization has occurred is contested,70 
there is close to a consensus that elites have become more polarized over 
the course of the past several decades.71 Because appointees to 
multimember agencies are generally drawn from the “political class,”72 
elite polarization rather than mass polarization is the more relevant 
phenomenon for our purposes. By most measures, the partisan sorting of 
elites accelerated in the mid- to late-1970s and has continued to pick up 
                                                                                                                                
 69. See Morris P. Fiorina & Matthew S. Levendusky, Disconnected: The Political Class 
Versus the People, in 1 Red and Blue Nation?: Characteristics and Causes of America’s 
Polarized Parties 49, 50 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006) (describing various 
constituencies in the “political class” and the existence of significant differences in 
political views within this group). 
 70. Compare Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Ideological Realignment in the 
U.S. Electorate, 60 J. Pol. 634, 649 (1998) (finding that “increasing ideological 
polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties in the Reagan and post-Reagan 
eras made it easier for voters to recognize the differences between the parties’ policy 
stands” and choose “their party identification” based on policy preferences rather than 
strict party allegiance), with Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel A. Abrams & Jeremy C. Pope, 
Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings, 70 J. Pol. 556, 558 
(2008) (stating that “party sorting has proceeded much less in the general public than 
among party elites”). 
 71. See Fiorina et al., supra note 70, at 557 (“There is general agreement that party 
elites have become significantly more distinct over the course of the past several 
decades . . . .”). 
 72. See infra note 108 (looking at the propensity of PBR appointees to contribute to 
political candidates and finding that the “ideological distribution of bureaucratic 
appointments broadly reflects the president’s preferences”). 
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steam ever since.73 On most accounts, the partisan realignment of the 
South—with white conservative Democrats moving to the Republican 
Party—was an important but nonexclusive factor contributing to partisan 
sort.74 Whatever the causes, few scholars would dispute that ideology is a 
stronger predictor of partisan affiliation today than it was twenty-five to 
thirty-five years ago.75 
The following figure provides one window on this partisan sort. The 
figure uses DW-NOMINATE ideal point estimates—estimates of legis-
lators’ ideological preferences based on their roll call voting records—to 
track partisan sort over the past fifty years.76 The solid red line charts the 
median Republican House member’s ideal point from 1963 (close to the 
nadir of polarization in the twentieth century) through 2013; the dotted 
light blue and dashed dark blue lines report those values for the median 
southern and non-southern Democratic representative, respectively. The 
figure illustrates two reasons why partisan sort has occurred: (1) the 
Republican Party became more conservative over a half century; and (2) 
southern (but not northern) Democrats became more liberal.77 The 
                                                                                                                                
 73. See, e.g., Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary 
American Politics, 46 Polity 411, 415 (2014) (observing—on the basis of voting patterns 
among members of the House and Senate—that “the parties began to diverge in the mid-
1970s and this trend has continued unabated into the most recent Congress”); Marc J. 
Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization, 95 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 619, 622–23 (2001) (observing—also on the basis of congressional voting 
patterns—that polarization reached a “trough” in the mid-1970s but began a “steady rise” 
starting with the Carter years and a “second spike” in the last two years of George H.W. 
Bush’s presidency). 
 74. See Hare & Poole, supra note 73, at 417 (“[T]he southern realignment does not 
fully account for the increase in polarization. The Republican Party became much more 
conservative across all regions of the United States.”); Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan 
Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper, 43 Presidential Stud. Q. 688, 691 
(2013) (stating that the “main source” of polarization was “the partisan realignment of the 
South” but noting that “[c]onservative whites outside the South also moved toward the 
Republican Party, while liberals became overwhelmingly Democratic”). 
 75. See, e.g., Joseph Bafumi & Robert Y. Shapiro, A New Partisan Voter, 71 J. Pol. 1, 3 
(2009) (explaining that “changes have given way to an electorate that is more strongly 
driven by liberal/conservative ideological concerns” today). 
 76. These data were derived from Party Medians from DW-NOMINATE Congresses 
1–113, Voteview (Mar. 23, 2015), http://legacy.voteview.com/pmediant.htm [http:// 
perma.cc/3Y52-E74N]. DW-NOMINATE arranges legislators on a -1 to 1 scale based on 
their roll call voting records, placing legislators with similar voting records close together 
on the scale. Id. The measure does not consider the content of the roll call votes. Id. Once 
the algorithm is run for a large set of votes, the optimal placement of legislators along with 
scale makes it obvious to any political observer that legislators placed near -1 are very 
liberal and those placed near 1 are very conservative. See Keith T. Poole & Howard 
Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting 23–24 (2000). 
 77. As the figure shows, the trend toward polarization is asymmetric, with greater 
movement away from the middle among Republicans than among Democrats. For further 
discussion, see Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: 
The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches 11 (2006) (noting that “Republicans in the 
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latter phenomenon is attributable to the fact that a large number of 
white conservatives in the South have changed their party affiliation from 
Democratic to Republican, leaving a more liberal and largely African 
American Democratic Party in southern states.78 
 
FIGURE 1: PARTY POLARIZATION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
Figure 2 provides another perspective on partisan sort. It shows the 
gap in DW-NOMINATE scores for the median Democratic and Republican 
members of the House between 1963 and 2013. The takeaway from 
Figures 1 and 2 is clear: The parties have become more ideologically 
distinct over the past fifty years. The increase has been nearly monotonic, 
with polarization accelerating in the second half of this period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
North and South have moved sharply to the right,” while “Northern Democrats . . . don’t 
look sharply different from the Democrats of old”). 
 78. See Nelson W. Polsby, How Congress Evolves 151 (2005). 
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FIGURE 2: IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE HOUSE 
 
 
The phenomenon of partisan sort has clear implications for the 
ideological composition of multimember agencies subject to PBRs. In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, when both parties remained relatively 
ideologically heterogeneous at the elite level, one might expect the effect 
of PBRs on ideological composition to be muted. A Democratic 
President making a cross-party appointment would not be forced to 
choose from among conservatives; likewise, a Republican President 
would likely be able to find qualified Democrats who were not liberals. 
But as partisan sort accelerated over the last two decades of the twentieth 
century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, one might expect 
the effect of PBRs on ideological composition to grow stronger. That is, 
insofar as supply-side constraints account for the effect of PBRs on the 
ideological composition of multimember agencies, one might expect 
that effect to increase as supply-side constraints become more binding. 
Accordingly, one way to assess the plausibility of the supply-side 
theory is to look at whether the effect of PBRs on the ideological 
composition of multimember agencies has increased over time. If it has, 
then that finding would place the supply-side theory on firmer footing. 
Further discussion of this point is deferred until Part II, which explains 
tests conducted to determine whether the effect of PBRs on ideological 
composition is temporally dependent. But first, section I.C.2 considers 
whether PBRs might affect ideological composition through an 
alternative causal mechanism. 
2. The Demand-Side Theory. — Once a President has selected a 
nominee for an agency post, she must “sell” that nominee to the Senate. 
The confirmation hurdle imposes a potential demand-side constraint on 
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the President’s ability to stock multimember agencies with ideologically 
sympathetic appointees. Senators from the opposition party may use 
what leverage they have to ensure that the President selects a “bona fide” 
member of the opposition party when a PBR forces a cross-party 
appointment.79 To satisfy senators—the “consumers” in the market 
metaphor—the President may have to honor the spirit of PBRs when 
choosing cross-party commissioners. 
Insofar as demand-side constraints compel Democratic Presidents to 
choose conservative Republican commissioners and Republican Presidents 
to name liberal Democrats, one might expect these constraints to be most 
binding under conditions of divided government. Presumably, the 
Senate is more likely to stop a Democratic President from appointing a 
liberal Republican to satisfy a PBR when the Senate is Republican-
controlled than when the Democrats have a majority (and vice versa 
when it is a Republican President seeking to place a conservative 
Democrat on a commission). To be sure, even a minority opposition 
party in the Senate has historically been able to stop a nominee from 
being confirmed through the filibuster, provided that it could muster 
forty-one votes. But with the abolition of the filibuster for agency 
nominees in November 2013,80 the minority party in the Senate no 
longer has this weapon in its arsenal. 
The demand-side theory, like the supply-side theory, leads us to ex-
pect that the effect of PBRs on the ideological composition of 
multimember agencies would vary across time. In particular, we might 
expect the effect to be strongest when the White House and Senate are 
controlled by different parties, such that the Senate can easily block a 
cross-party appointee who is ideologically sympathetic to the President. 
We might also expect the effect to be especially weak in the few periods 
when the President’s party has held a filibuster-proof Senate majority. 
Our dataset encompasses two such periods—both under President 
Obama. First, the Democrats held sixty Senate seats from July 2009 (after 
Democrat Al Franken was sworn in as senator from Minnesota81) until 
January 2010 (when the Democrats lost a Senate seat from Massachusetts 
                                                                                                                                
 79. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party 
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 459, 488 (2008) 
(“[O]pposition Senators regularly use holds and other delaying strategies to pressure the 
President to appoint party loyalists to slots held by opposition-party members.”). 
 80. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most 
Filibusters on Nominees, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of- 
precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
 81. See Mark Zdechlik, Franken Brings 60th Vote to Senate Dems, Minn. Pub. 
Radio (July 1, 2009), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2009/07/01/franken60 [http:// 
perma.cc/K8FR-MWCU]. 
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following Republican Scott Brown’s victory in a special election82). And 
second, after the Senate eliminated the filibuster for confirmation votes 
on nominees to non-Supreme Court appointments in November 2013, 
the Democrats retained a narrow majority until January 2015 (55-45, 
including two independents who caucused with the Democrats). 
The next Part examines whether PBRs do indeed affect the ideologi-
cal composition of multimember agencies—and, if so, why. Our 
approach allows us to test both the supply-side and demand-side theories, 
and to reach tentative conclusions as to why PBRs might have real-world 
consequences. 
II. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PARTISAN BALANCE REQUIREMENTS 
This Part presents an empirical analysis of the effect of partisan bal-
ance requirements on the ideological composition of multimember 
agencies. Section II.A describes our data and explains our research 
design. Section II.B presents initial results. Section II.C considers supply-
side and demand-side explanations for the efficacy of PBRs. 
A. Data and Research Design 
To explore the relationship between the partisan and ideological 
outlooks of appointees to agencies with partisan balance requirements 
(PBR agencies), we first must define the population of PBR agencies. 
Then, we must identify both the partisan identification and ideological 
orientation for each appointee to these PBR agencies. This section 
details our process for collecting data on (1) PBR agencies, (2) 
appointee partisanship, and (3) appointee ideology. 
1. Agencies with Partisan Balance Requirements. — PBR agencies share 
one essential attribute: a restriction, grounded in statute or a deeply en-
trenched norm, on the number of individuals from the same political 
party that may be appointed to the agency’s multimember governing 
board. We examined appointments to twenty-three agencies83 that meet 
this definition and that were in existence between 1979 and 2014.84 
                                                                                                                                
 82. See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. Times (Jan. 19, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
 83. These twenty-three PBR agencies are: the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), Farm Credit Administration (FCA), Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), National Credit 
Union Administration (NCUA), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), National 
Mediation Board (NMB), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), Securities and 
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With the exception of the NLRB, these agencies’ PBRs are imposed 
by statute.85 (We classify the NLRB as a PBR agency based on a firmly 
entrenched norm favoring partisan balance on that body.86) The 
structural features of these agencies vary considerably. Table 1 reports 
the presence or absence of design features in these agencies that, along 
with PBRs, are commonly considered to be indicia of agency 
independence.87 
For-cause removal protection prevents the President from removing 
an appointee at will, requiring that the President show cause to do so be-
fore the expiration of the appointee’s term.88 For instance, FTC commis-
sioners may be removed only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”89 Fixed terms in office further insulate appointees 
                                                                                                                                
Exchange Commission (SEC), Surface Transportation Board (STB, formerly the Interstate 
Commerce Commission), and U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). 
 84. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 784 & n.89; George A. Krause & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, Replication Data for: Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of 
the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency Leadership Appointments 
(2015) [hereinafter Krause & O’Connell, Replication Data], http:// 
dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2681304&version=RELEASED&version=.2 (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review); David C. Nixon, The Independent Regulatory 
Commissioner Data Base, http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dnixon/IRC/index.htm [http:// 
perma.cc/XK2Y-2E2B] (last updated Mar. 10, 2005). 
 85. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2012) (mandating that the EEOC “be 
composed of five members, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same 
political party”). 
 86. See infra notes 127–131 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 18 (2010) (outlining some of the design features 
that act as “more robust checks against agency capture under asymmetrical political 
conditions than the use of traditional factors alone”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 784 
& n.89. An agency’s multimember structure is another common feature of independent 
agencies. See Barkow, supra, at 17; Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 792–97. Because all 
PBR agencies are by definition headed by multiple members, Table 1 omits this feature. 
Among these twenty-three agencies, the NMB is an outlier in two respects. First, its power 
to bind outside parties is limited. The NMB can compel railroads or airlines and their 
employees to arbitrate labor disputes if certain conditions are met; if one party refuses to 
arbitrate, the NMB can authorize a labor strike or a lockout by management. 45 U.S.C. 
§ 155 (2012). Second, its structure includes only three indicia of independence: fixed 
terms, PBRs, and multimember boards. Nonetheless, we think the NMB deserves 
inclusion. Given the historical significance of labor disputes in the railroad industry and 
the importance of the transportation sector to the national economy, the NMB’s powers, 
though limited, are nontrivial. See generally Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulations 
(2014). Further, fixed terms and PBRs—both of which the NMB has—are considered 
particularly important indicia of independence. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and 
Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L.J. 257, 259. Nonetheless, excluding the 
NMB from our analysis does not materially change the results. 
 88. See Barkow, supra note 87, at 27. 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 5841(e); see also Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 
627–32 (1935). However, neither Congress nor the courts have defined these broad terms 
constituting good cause, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986), which raises the 
possibility that removal protections would not constrain a motivated President. See 
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to PBR agencies from the White House and thus provide a second indi-
cium of agency independence.90 The ability to pursue litigation 
independent of the Justice Department (litigation authority); bypass 
centralized OMB review and submit budgets directly to Congress (bypass 
authority”); and craft policy through formal adjudication, which is less 
susceptible to political interference than rulemaking (adjudication 
authority), all foster agency independence as well.91 Finally, qualification 
requirements—for example, that members of the NTSB possess 
transportation-safety-related professional credentials and experience92—
constrain the President’s hand in appointments.93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1, 110–11 (1994) (discussing the vagueness of the statute’s reference to “good cause” 
and how the President could use this to retain “a large degree of removal and supervisory 
power”). 
 90. See Peter L. Strauss, An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United 
States 15 (1989) (explaining how fixed terms for appointees to PBR agencies can separate 
them from “presidential influence”). 
 91. Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 799–804 (discussing litigation authority); id. at 
804–08 (discussing bypass authority); id. at 808–12 (discussing adjudication authority). 
 92. 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012). 
 93. See William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. 
Pol. 1095, 1098–99 (2002). We exclude U.S. citizenship requirements, which impose de 
minimis constraints on appointments, from our classification of qualification 
requirements. 
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TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF INCLUDED PBR AGENCIES94 
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CFTC  ● ● ● ● ● 
CPSC ● ● ● ● ● ● 
DNFSB  ●  ● ● ● 
EEOC  ● ●  ●  
Ex-Im  ● ●    
FCA  ● ● ●  ● 
FCC  ●   ●  
FDIC  ● ● ●  ● 
FEC  ● ● ● ● ● 
FERC ● ● ● ● ● ● 
FLRA ● ● ●  ●  
FMC ● ● ●  ●  
FTC ● ● ●  ●  
MSPB ● ●  ● ● ● 
NCUA  ●  ● ● ● 
NLRB ● ● ●  ●  
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 94. See Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., RL33886, Statutory Qualifications for 
Executive Branch Positions 26–30 tbl.A-2 (2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
RL33886.pdf [http://perma.cc/C572-XUD7] (identifying agencies with qualification 
requirements); Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 786 tbl.1 (identifying agencies with 
statutory removal protection); id. at 790 tbl.2 (identifying agencies with fixed terms); id. at 
800 tbl.5 (identifying agencies with litigation authority); id. at 804 tbl.6 (identifying 
agencies with bypass authority); id. at 809 tbl.7 (identifying agencies with adjudication 
authority). 
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NMB  ●     
NRC ● ●   ●  
NTSB  ● ●  ● ● ● 
PRC ● ●  ● ● ● 
SEC  ● ● ● ●  
STB / ICC ● ● ● ● ● ● 
USITC  ● ● ●  ● 
 
As Table 1 shows, these agencies vary considerably in terms of their 
particular mix of most of the other indicia of independence—except for 
the fact that all PBR agencies also feature statutorily mandated fixed 
terms for their commissioners or board members. That feature is 
remarkably common; among all executive agencies that are typically 
classified as independent, only three relatively minor agencies do not 
require set terms for their leaders.95 
2. Appointee Party Identification. — Having identified the set of PBR 
agencies for this study, we turn to determining the partisan affiliations of 
appointees to these agencies. For eleven agencies (the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), EEOC, FCC, FEC, FERC, FTC, 
NLRB, NTSB, NRC, SEC, and Surface Transportation Board (STB)), we 
obtained the name, date of nomination, and partisan identification for 
each individual appointed between 1979 and 2008 from an executive-
appointee biographical dataset compiled by Professors George Krause 
and Anne Joseph O’Connell.96 We then extended this analysis through 
                                                                                                                                
 95. Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 790 tbl.2 (listing the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and U.S. Agency for International 
Development as the only currently existing independent agencies without specified tenure 
for appointees). 
 96. See Krause & O’Connell, Replication Data, supra note 84. Krause and 
O’Connell’s dataset reports whether each appointee “has [the] same or strongly 
presumed partisan affiliation as [the] appointing president.” See Anne Joseph O’Connell 
& George A. Krause, Variable Codebook for Manuscript & Supporting Information 
Document (2015), http://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2681274&version=1.2 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also George A. Krause & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, Compliance, Competence, and Bureaucratic Leadership in U.S. Federal 
Government Agencies: A Bayesian Generalized Latent Trait Analysis 6–7 (Sept. 19, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9f96/d968768c293 
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2014 via Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports containing the 
same information for appointments made between 2000 and 2014.97 To 
assess the reliability of both data sources, we examined the extent to 
which the two sources include identical information for appointees 
during the period from 2002 to 2008 for which the two sources overlap. 
Inter-observer reliability between the two data sources is extremely high; 
the appointee names, nomination dates, and partisan affiliations 
reported in the two sources in this period were identical. 
For the other twelve agencies, we built an original dataset that in-
cludes the name, date of nomination, and party affiliation for each indi-
vidual appointed as a board member or commissioner from 1979 
through 1999. We drew information on name and date of nomination 
from congressional records and determined partisan identifications from 
a variety of other sources, including newspaper reports around the time 
of nomination and obituaries of now-deceased appointees. Once again, 
we extended this analysis through 2014 via CRS reports. 
3. Appointee Ideology. — Finally, we employ the Database on Ideology, 
Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) to determine the ideological 
preferences of each appointee.98 Developed by Adam Bonica, DIME con-
tains over 130 million political contributions made by 14.7 million 
individuals and 1.7 million organizations to over 80,000 political action 
committees and candidates in federal, state, and local elections between 
1979 and 2014.99 DIME leverages these data to generate ideology-based 
                                                                                                                                
aad47539d38d2a0a977aa85a6.pdf?-_ga=2.225073178.1651911087.15054242832085157714. 
1505424283 [http://perma.cc/CB5E-MQMR] (describing the database). 
 97. See generally Michael Greene, Cong. Research Serv., R43893, Presidential 
Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and 
Commissions, 112th Congress (2015); Henry Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., R43238, 
Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial 
Boards and Commissions, 111th Congress (2013); Henry B. Hogue & Maureen Bearden, 
Cong. Research Serv., R41463, Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on 
Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions, 110th Congress (2010); Henry 
Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL34744, Presidential Appointments to Full-Time 
Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions, 109th Congress 
(2009); Henry Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL32742, Presidential Appointments to 
Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and Commissions, 108th 
Congress (2005); Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., RL30910, Presidential 
Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial Boards and 
Commissions, 107th Congress (2003); Rogelio Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., RL 30476, 
Presidential Appointments to Full-Time Positions on Regulatory and Other Collegial 
Boards and Commissions, 106th Congress (2001). We excluded from our analysis the nine 
appointees whom the CRS Reports classified as “independent.” 
 98. Adam Bonica, Codebook for the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and 
Elections (DIME) (Version 2.0) (2016) [hereinafter Bonica, Codebook for DIME], 
http://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2865308&version=2.2 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 99. Id. at 3 (providing statistics for the most recent update to DIME). Contribution 
data are derived from the FEC and several good-government organizations. See Bonica, 
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scores, referred to as Campaign Finance Scores (CFscores), for all donors 
and recipients during this period.100 
The intuition behind DIME is simple: Individuals’ decisions to con-
tribute to political campaigns constitute revealed preferences concerning 
their political views.101 The destination and amount of an individual’s 
campaign contributions disclose information regarding that individual’s 
ideological “ideal point.” DIME’s algorithm uses this information on all 
of an individual’s donations between 1979 and 2014 to place donors 
along a scale based on their history of campaign contributions.102 The 
                                                                                                                                
Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 370 (explaining where the records comprising 
the databases were collected from). 
 100. The use of spatial scores to measure the preferences of political actors is well 
established in political science. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 368. 
Their application to legal scholarship has become increasingly common in recent years. 
See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, Supreme Court Justices’ Loyalty to the President, 
45 J. Legal Stud. 401, 408–11 (2016) (using statistical analysis of voting by Supreme Court 
Justices to demonstrate a “loyalty effect” that suggests Justices feel “personal loyalty to the 
president” that appointed her or him, “not loyalty to the groups (like parties) or ideas 
(like the Constitution)”); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 
1903, 1905–07 (2012) (using spatial scores analysis to identify issues in political 
gerrymandering). 
In particular, DIME’s CFscores have been employed or cited in a wide variety of 
social-scientific and legal scholarship since their debut in 2013. See, e.g., Adam Bonica, 
Adam S. Chilton & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers, 8 J. Legal 
Analysis 277, 279 (2016) (employing DIME data to explore the ideology of American 
lawyers); Abby K. Wood & Douglas M. Spencer, In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of 
Transparency on State Political Campaigns, 15 Election L.J. 302, 307–08 (2016) (using 
DIME data to determine that campaign disclosure requirements had a negligible effect in 
chilling speech and deterring political participation). 
 101. Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 367. 
 102. For a technical explanation of DIME’s estimation strategy, see id. at 369–70. 
Essentially, DIME places donors along a unidimensional scale so as to minimize the 
distance between donors with similar patterns of political giving. DIME then places 
recipients along a unidimensional scale so as to minimize the distance between recipients 
with similar donor pools. That some donors also are recipients provides a “bridge,” 
enabling DIME to place donors and recipients on the same scale. Likewise, that some 
donors contribute to both state and federal campaigns and that some recipients run for 
both state and federal office provide additional bridge observations. These bridges enable 
DIME to create a single ideological scale for a massive number of individuals across thirty-
six years of politics. See Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, A Common-Space Measure 
of State Supreme Court Ideology, 31 J.L. Econ. & Org. 472, 476–77 (2015) (presenting a 
“method to construct ideological measures for state Supreme Court justices from 
campaign finance records”). Bonica has subjected DIME to several tests to evaluate the 
validity of the measure. Concerning the measure’s external validity, CFscores for members 
of Congress correlate closely with the scores assigned to these legislators by DW-
NOMINATE, a well-established method of estimating legislators’ ideal points based on 
their roll-call voting records. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 370–
71 (reporting that r = 0.92 for the bivariate correlation between these two estimates). 
Concerning internal validity, for individuals that were active donors or recipients 
throughout the period from 1979 to 2014, the static CFscores derived from their activity 
during the entire period are closely correlated with CFscores derived from these 
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scale ranges from -2 (assigned to the most liberal donors) to 2 (assigned 
to the most conservative donors).103 The mean CFscore for donors is 0 
and the standard deviation is 1.104 
To obtain each appointee’s CFscore, we searched the DIME 
project’s dataset on appointees to federal agencies,105 as well as the 
project’s full database on all contributors to federal, state, and local 
elections between 1979 and 2014.106 For individuals with common names 
or names with multiple entries in the full database, we cross-checked the 
individual’s profession, employer, and place of residence as reported in 
DIME with the appointee’s biographical information available via online 
sources—For example, biographical sketches on current employers’ 
websites, LinkedIn profiles, or obituaries—to determine whether the 
individual located in DIME and the appointee were the same person. 
This method yielded CFscores for 80% of appointees (578 of 722) to the 
twenty-three PBR agencies107 we identified. This 80% match rate is 
comparable to the success rates of similar studies that employ DIME to 
determine the ideologies of members of other elite groups.108 
Readers may wonder whether campaign contributions truly capture 
donors’ political preferences. Donors may instead choose to give for a 
range of strategic reasons—for example, to encourage the election of 
politicians sympathetic to the donors’ business interests or to curry favor 
with existing officeholders in exchange for access, votes, or other 
services.109 This critique may seem particularly powerful for our research 
                                                                                                                                
individuals’ activity during select years within this range. See id. at 373 (reporting that R2 = 
0.97 for the bivariate correlation between these two estimates). 
 103. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 369. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Adam Bonica, Executive Appointees to Federal Agencies, Database on Ideology, 
Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (2015) [hereinafter Bonica, Executive 
Appointees, DIME], http://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/ 
DVN/O5PX0B [http://perma.cc/DKY4-HLEJ]; see also Adam Bonica, Jowei Chen & Tim 
Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the 
Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy, 10 Q.J. Pol. Sci. 5, 7 
(2015) [hereinafter Bonica, Chen & Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping] (using a “formal 
model that examines how Senate committees and the presidential staffing of ‘inferior 
offices’ affect the ideological distribution of appointed public bureaucrats”). 
 106. Bonica, Codebook for DIME, supra note 98. 
 107. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of 
Corporations and Their Directors and Executives, 18 Bus. & Pol. 367, 375 (2016) (finding 
an 83% match rate for Fortune 500 CEOs and board members); Adam Bonica, Adam S. 
Chilton, Jacob Goldin, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks, 
19 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 96, 105 (2017) (reporting a 66% match rate for former Supreme 
Court clerks); Bonica, Chen & Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping, supra note 105, at 20 
(reporting a 72% match rate for a subset of appointees under Presidents Clinton and 
George W. Bush). 
 109. See Sanford C. Gordon, Catherine Hafer & Dimitri Landa, Consumption or 
Investment? On Motivations for Political Giving, 69 J. Pol. 1057, 1058 (2007) (describing 
donors’ varied potential motives). 
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design, given that all donors in our sample actually did receive something 
of value—an executive appointment—at some point during the thirty-six-
year period in which they made at least one campaign contribution. Our 
response to this concern is twofold. First, we rely on a large body of 
political science research finding that individuals make political 
contributions sincerely—not strategically.110 Survey results indicate that 
donors consider the recipient’s ideology to be the most important factor 
when deciding whether to give, placing ideology far above more strategic 
considerations such as electability, incumbent status, and ability to 
influence the candidate.111 Accordingly, the dominant view among 
political scientists considers campaign contributions as a form of 
consumption among “political hobbyists” rather than an investment by 
strategic actors.112 Second, insofar as a divergence between donors’ 
ideological preferences and the ideal points reflected by their campaign 
contributions introduces measurement error into our analysis, we find it 
hard to explain why such a divergence would account for the change 
over time that we document in the next section. (Below we consider 
whether the easy observability of campaign contributions in the Internet 
age might affect our results, and we find strong evidence that it does 
not.113) 
B. Results 
1. Descriptive Statistics. — With these data on appointee ideology and 
partisan identification in hand, we turn to analyzing the effects of PBRs 
on the composition of agency leadership ranks. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the appointees included in our data: 578 appointees to 
twenty-three agencies over thirty-six years. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 110. See, e.g., Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 370; Michael J. 
Ensley, Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideology, 138 Pub. Choice 221, 
230 (2009); Nolan McCarty & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Commitment and the Campaign 
Contribution Contract, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 872, 875–81 (1996). 
 111. See Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and 
Ideology, 69 Pol. Res. Q. 148, 154 & tbl.1 (2016). 
 112. See Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, Jr., Why Is 
There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 105, 105 (2003) (concluding 
that campaign contributions are best understood not as political investment but as a type 
of consumption good). See generally Eitan Hersh, Political Hobbyism: A Theory of Mass 
Politics (Mar. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.eitanhersh.com/ 
uploads/7/9/7/5/7975685/hersh_theory_of_hobbyism_v2.0.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (arguing that for many Americans, “political participation is not 
appropriately described as motivated by duty, but is more akin to a hobby”). 
 113. See infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. 
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TABLE 2: OVERVIEW APPOINTEES BY PRESIDENT 
 
Appointing President 
 
 
 
Co-Party Appointees 
 
Cross-Party Appointees 
Total 
Appts. 
Appts. per 
Year 
Total 
Appts. 
Appts. per 
Year 
All (1979–2014) 
 
362 6.6 216 4.0 
Democratic 
Presidents 
155 5.9 96 3.8 
Republican 
Presidents 
207 7.2 120 4.3 
Carter 11 5.5 9 4.5 
Reagan 56 7.0 38 4.8 
G.H.W. Bush 39 9.75 17 4.3 
Clinton 75 9.4 48 6.0 
G.W. Bush 112 14.0 65 8.2 
Obama 69 11.5 39 6.5 
n = 578. Includes appointees to twenty-three agencies from 1979 to 2014. Carter years 
include 1979 to 1980 only; Obama years include 2009 to 2014 only. 
 
Unsurprisingly, all Presidents during this period tended to appoint 
their fellow party members to PBR agencies; 63% of appointees (362 of 
578) belonged to the same party as the appointing President.114 This tilt 
                                                                                                                                
 114. Interestingly, the proportion of appointees that share the President’s party label 
almost perfectly mirrors the no-more-than-three-of-five requirement that is typical among 
independent agencies. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 776. 
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is not the result of Presidents disregarding PBR statutes.115 Rather, most 
partisan balance statutes do not require perfect balance but permit a 
bare majority of members to be affiliated with the same political party—
one possible explanation for the tilt.116 Another contributor to the 
imbalance may be that co-partisan appointees strategically retire before 
the end of their terms when a friendly President is in office (leading to 
more openings for co-party slots during any given presidency).117 Table 3 
contains descriptive statistics concerning the ideologies of appointees to 
PBR agencies, arranged by President and by whether the appointee and 
appointing President shared a partisan affiliation. For each President, 
Table 3 also reports differences in the mean ideology of co-party versus 
cross-party appointees.118 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 115. The imbalance was greatest during the presidency of George H.W. Bush, who was 
not known for his sharp partisan elbows. See Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power: The 
American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush 390 (2015). 
 116. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012) (mandating that no more than three out of 
the five SEC commissioners be affiliated with the same party); id. § 2053(c) (mandating 
that no more than three out of the five CPSC commissioners be affiliated with the same 
party). But see, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1) (Supp. II 2015) (requiring exact partisan 
balance on the FEC). 
 117. Cf. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial 
Appointments 37 (2005) (summarizing studies showing that appellate judges strategically 
time their retirements to increase the likelihood that like-minded successors will replace 
them). 
Note that the number of appointees per year who appear in DIME is somewhat lower 
for the Carter and Reagan Administrations than for later presidencies. We attribute this 
trend to three factors. First, public disclosure of federal campaign contributions did not 
begin until 1972, and DIME’s coverage starts in 1979. See Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 304, 86 Stat. 3, 14–15 (1972) (codified as amended at 52 
U.S.C. § 30104). Thus, Carter and Reagan appointees who made their last campaign 
contributions before the late 1970s will generally not appear in DIME. Second, the $200 
reporting threshold has not changed since 1980, despite intervening inflation. See Federal 
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, sec. 104, § 10(b)(3), 93 
Stat. 1339, 1352 (1980) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30104). Individuals who made 
campaign contributions in more recent years thus are more likely to exceed the threshold 
and trigger a public disclosure. Finally, one agency was established partway through the 
period from 1979 to 2014, resulting in a small increase in the number of positions to be 
filled. See National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, 
§ 1441(a), 102 Stat. 1918, 2076 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2286 (2012)) 
(establishing the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board). Excluding the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board from the analysis does not materially alter any of our results. 
 118. The final column in Table 3 reports the p value for a series of two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests for differences in distributions. Low p values counsel in 
favor of rejecting the null hypothesis that the distribution of CFscores for co-party 
appointees and the distribution of CFscores for cross-party appointees were drawn from 
the same underlying distribution. All of the reported p values meet—and, for all but the 
Carter appointees, far exceed—the conventionally accepted p < 0.05 threshold for 
statistical significance. 
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TABLE 3: APPOINTEE IDEOLOGY, BY PRESIDENT 
 
 
Appointing 
President 
 
Mean CFscore 
(Standard Deviation) 
Diff. in 
Means119 
(95% 
Conf. 
Interval) 
KS Test p-value 
Co-Party 
Appointees
Cross-
Party 
Appointees
 
Democratic 
Presidents 
 
-0.913 
(0.521) 
0.774 
(0.535) 
1.687 
(1.549, 
1.826) 
0.000 
 
Republican 
Presidents 
 
0. 848 
(0.368) 
-0.492 
(0.808) 
1.340 
(1.182, 
1.497) 
0.000 
 
Carter 
 
-0.494 
(0.749) 
0.301 
(0.828) 
0.795 
(0.011, 
1.601) 
0.047 
 
Reagan 
 
0.797 
(0.539) 
-0.005 
(0.794) 
0.802 
(0.496, 
1.108) 
0.000 
 
G.H.W. Bush 
 
0.846 
(0.422) 
-0.162 
(0.900) 
1.008 
(0.497, 
1.520) 
0.000 
 
Clinton 
 
-0.875 
(0.408) 
0.747 
(0.494) 
1.622 
(1.447, 
1.798) 
0.000 
 
G.W. Bush 
 
0.873 
(0.213) 
-0.830 
(0.615) 
1.703 
(1.546, 
1.861) 
0.000 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 119. Difference in means refers to the absolute value of the difference in mean 
CFscore for co-party appointees and mean CFscore for cross-party appointees. 
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Appointing 
President 
 
Mean CFscore 
(Standard Deviation) 
Diff. in 
Means120 
(95% Conf. 
Interval) 
KS Test p-value 
 
Obama 
 
-1.015 
(0.563) 
0.902 
(0.458) 
1.917 
(1.719, 
2.116) 
0.000 
n = 578. Includes appointees to twenty-three agencies from 1979 to 2014. Absolute 
values of differences in means between co-party and cross-party appointees reported. 
Differences in means calculated via Welch’s t-tests, appropriate for samples with 
skewed distributions drawn from independent populations. Carter years include 1979 
to 1980 only; Obama years include 2009 to 2014 only. During the entire period from 
1979 to 2014, the mean CFscore for all appointees was 0.078 (sd = 0.961). 
 
The key takeaway from Table 3 emerges from the column displaying 
the difference in means between co-party and cross-party appointees. 
During the Carter Administration, the point estimate for the ideological 
gap between co-party and cross-party appointees to PBR agencies is 
0.795, which indicates a modest ideological difference (less than one 
standard deviation) between Carter’s co-party and cross-party 
appointees.121 This gap grows steadily in subsequent administrations, 
reaching 1.917 in the Obama years—almost two-and-one-half times the 
size of the gap under Carter. The widening occurs over Democratic as 
well as Republican administrations. Accordingly, at first glance the most 
notable aspect of this difference is its growth over time, rather than its 
association with any particular party or presidency. 
2. Co-Party Versus Cross-Party Appointees. — What do the ideologies of 
appointees to PBR agencies look like? More specifically, how do the views 
of individuals appointed to Democratic seats by Democratic Presidents 
differ from those appointed to Democratic seats by Republican 
Presidents? And are the patterns similar for Republican appointees? 
To answer these questions, Figure 3 compares the ideological distri-
butions of all four categories of nominees. Democratic officials 
appointed by Democratic Presidents appear in dark blue, whereas 
Democrats appointed by Republicans appear in light blue; likewise, 
Republicans appointed by Republicans appear in dark red, whereas 
Republicans appointed by Democrats appear in light red. Because, for 
                                                                                                                                
 120. Difference in means refers to the absolute value of the difference in mean 
CFscore for co-party appointees and mean CFscore for cross-party appointees. 
 121. See Bonica, Ideological Marketplace, supra note 11, at 369 (stating that the mean 
CFscore for donors is zero and the standard deviation is one). 
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this analysis, the focus is on recent appointment behavior, the figure is 
limited to the period from 2000 to 2014. 
 
FIGURE 3: IDEOLOGIES OF APPOINTEES TO PBR AGENCIES, 2000–2014 
 
n = 347. Includes appointees made during the period from 2000 to 2014 to twenty-
three PBR agencies.  
 
 
Figure 3 reveals a striking feature of recent appointments to PBR 
agencies: Democrats appointed by Democratic Presidents have views 
virtually identical to those of Democrats appointed by Republican 
Presidents, and the same holds true of Republican appointees. Presidents 
Clinton and Obama did not name liberal Republicans to cross-party 
positions on PBR agencies; neither did President George W. Bush 
appoint conservative Democrats to cross-party seats. Instead, recent 
Presidents abided by the spirit of PBRs in those agencies’ organic 
statutes. 
Presidents’ willingness to appoint their ideological opponents to 
cross-party seats appears to be a recent development. The following 
several figures compare the ideologies of co-party and cross-party 
appointees beginning in 1979. Figure 4(a) displays the ideological 
distance between the CFscore of the appointing President and the mean 
CFscore of that President’s appointees to PBR agencies. For a 
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Democratic President, a negative value indicates that the mean 
appointee is more liberal than the appointing President, and a positive 
value indicates that the mean appointee is more conservative. For a 
Republican President, the reverse is true: Negative values indicate that 
the mean appointee is more conservative than the appointing President, 
and positive values indicate that the appointee is more liberal. Figure 
4(b) reports similar information by year. The bars emanating from the 
point estimates in both figures denote one standard deviation in each 
direction from the relevant mean. 
 
FIGURE 4(A): IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN APPOINTEES TO PBR 
AGENCIES AND THEIR APPOINTING PRESIDENTS 
 
 
 
n = 578. Point estimates, denoted as solid shapes, signify mean distance between 
appointees’ CFscore and the appointing President’s CFscore. The solid circles 
represent the mean CFscore for co-party appointees, whereas the solid triangles 
represent the mean CFscore for cross-party appointees. Positive values for appointees 
in a Democratic (Republican) administration signify that the mean appointee is more 
conservative (liberal) than the appointing President. Vertical bars extend one 
standard deviation above and below the mean. The appointing President’s CFscore is 
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standardized to y = 0. Carter years include 1979 to 1980 only; Obama years include 
2009 to 2014 only. 
 
 
FIGURE 4(B): IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN APPOINTEES TO PBR 
AGENCIES AND THEIR APPOINTING PRESIDENTS, BY YEAR 
 
 
n = 578. Point estimates, denoted as solid shapes, signify mean distance between 
appointees’ CFscore and the appointing President’s CFscore. The solid circles 
represent the mean CFscore for co-party appointees, whereas the solid triangles 
represent the mean CFscore for cross-party appointees. Positive values for appointees 
in a Democratic (Republican) administration signify that the mean appointee is more 
conservative (liberal) than the appointing President. Vertical bars extend one 
standard deviation above and below the mean. The appointing President’s CFscore is 
standardized to y = 0. 
 
The point estimates for Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show that cross-party 
appointees are more conservative than co-party appointees across all 
Democratic administrations and more liberal than co-party appointees in 
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all Republican administrations. This gap increases, in fits and spurts, 
throughout the period of study. During the Carter Administration, for in-
stance, the CFscore for the mean appointee to a Democratic seat was 
0.159 points to the left of President Carter’s CFscore, whereas the mean 
appointee to a Republican seat had a CFscore that was 0.636 points to 
the right of President Carter—a gap of 0.795 points. By the Obama 
Administration, the mean Democratic appointee was 0.637 points to the 
right of President Obama, while the mean Republican appointee was 
2.471 points to the right of President Obama—a gap of 1.834 points. In 
other words, the ideological gap between co-party and cross-party 
appointees within the same party widened over time. 
The associated standard deviations in both figures provide further 
support for this finding. In Figure 4(a), the standard deviation bars for 
co-party and cross-party appointees overlap during the Carter, Reagan, 
and George H.W. Bush Administrations, indicating that a sizable number 
of co-party and cross-party appointees are ideologically similar. The bars 
then pull apart in the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama years, 
signifying significantly less ideological overlap between co-party and 
cross-party appointees during these presidencies. The standard deviation 
bars in Figure 4(b) tell a similar story. 
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) appear to demonstrate a time trend, with the 
ideological distance between cross-party appointees and their appointing 
President increasing over time. Figure 5, below, provides a better sense of 
this time trend. The figure plots the difference in ideological score be-
tween the appointing President and cross-party appointees over the 
thirty-six-year study period and includes a linear regression line. The 
positive slope suggests the presence of a trend component. 
 
FIGURE 5: TIME TREND IN IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN THE 
APPOINTING PRESIDENT AND CROSS-PARTY APPOINTEES 
Time
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The supply-side theory suggests that we should observe steady 
growth in the ideological gap between cross-party appointees and their 
appointing President over time, consistent with the pattern of partisan 
sort shown in Figure 2. By contrast, the supply-side theory gives us no 
reason to expect any similar changes over time in the gap between co-
party appointees and their appointing President. None of the six 
Presidents in our study period (Carter through Obama) exhibited 
ideological preferences that were radically out of step with the 
mainstream of his own party. Accordingly, we would expect these 
Presidents to be able to find co-partisans whose views roughly matched 
their own. Visually, Figures 4 and 5 align with the supply-side theory’s 
predictions: Cross-party appointees have grown further apart from the 
appointing President, while co-party appointees have not. 
3. Ideological Consistency. — Our analysis thus far treats appointees’ 
ideologies as time-invariant. The DIME master database assigns each 
donor a single CFscore based on that individual’s total contributions 
during the period from 1979 to 2014, and we adopt this measure as a 
proxy for ideology in the analysis above. Yet we are mindful that 
individuals may evolve in their thinking, or that they may donate 
strategically prior to their appointment so as to send a signal of ideology 
that differs from their true preferences. Fortunately, the available data 
allow us to observe whether donation patterns change post-appointment 
in ways that would suggest either ideological drift or strategic giving. 
Although ideological self-categorization is stable for most people 
throughout their lives,122 it may be less consistent among members of the 
political class from which appointees are drawn. The notion that elite ac-
tors display ideological fluidity over their careers is familiar to students of 
judicial behavior. Observers of the Supreme Court have pointed to a so-
called “Greenhouse effect”—a trend of Supreme Court Justices “drift[ing] 
away from the conservatism of their early votes” and toward the more 
liberal preferences of “cultural elites.”123 While the Greenhouse effect 
generally refers to the evolution of appointees’ sincere preferences over 
time, a related possibility is that prospective appointees may misrepresent 
their preferences prior to confirmation and then reveal their true selves 
                                                                                                                                
 122. Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist & Eric Schickler, Partisan Hearts & Minds: 
Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters 28 (2002). 
 123. See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, 
Not the American People, 98 Geo. L.J. 1515, 1518 (2010). The “Greenhouse” in question 
is Linda Greenhouse, the longtime Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times. 
The term can be traced back to a 1992 speech by Judge Laurence Silberman, a Reagan 
appointee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, who claimed that 
Greenhouse’s reporting pressured Justices to take more liberal stances in order to garner 
favorable coverage from the Times. See Martin Tolchin, Press Is Condemned by a Federal 
Judge for Court Coverage, N.Y. Times (June 15, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/ 
06/15/us/press-is-condemned-by-a-federal-judge-for-court-coverage.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
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after they are sworn in.124 For example, a Democratic President may 
“sell” a nominee to the Senate as a genuine Republican, but the 
individual may turn out to be—after confirmation—a liberal who 
registered as a Republican and donated to conservative candidates for 
the purpose of positioning himself for a potential cross-party 
appointment. To return to our market metaphor, a potential appointee 
who looks like a peach from the opposition party’s perspective may turn 
out to be a lemon—and consumers (here, senators) have incomplete 
information regarding which nominees fall into which of these 
categories until after the transaction. 
To test the ideological consistency of appointees over time, we exam-
ined the donation patterns of commissioners in the eight years before 
and after their initial appointments. We looked at commissioners’ cycle-
specific scores derived from the biennial DIME contribution datasets, 
which include CFscores for donors in each two-year election cycle.125 
Naturally, these files are less comprehensive than the DIME master 
database for the period from 1979 to 2014; to be included in one of the 
election cycle-specific files, an individual must donate to a sufficient 
number of candidates or PACs to generate a CFscore for that cycle. 
Creating cycle-specific scores enables us to chart commissioners’ 
ideal point estimates over time and identify any changes in behavior 
around the time of their initial appointments. Here, we display results for 
the FCC, which in several respects is the archetypical agency with a PBR: 
The FCC has the modal number of commissioners (five), the modal term 
length (five years), and, like many of the twenty-three agencies in our 
study, was created during the New Deal era. 
Figure 6 displays our results for both Democratic and Republican ap-
pointees selected by both Democratic and Republican Presidents. To 
compare commissioners’ ideal point estimates before and after 
appointment, the x axis in both figures denotes the number of years 
since each commissioner was first appointed to the FCC (negative 
numbers thus represent pre-appointment years). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 124. On “stealth nominees” at the Supreme Court, see Michael Comiskey, The 
Supreme Court Appointment Process: Lessons from Filling the Rehnquist and O’Connor 
Vacancies, 41 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 355, 357 (2008). 
 125. We thank Adam Bonica and Kyle Rozema for their assistance in this analysis. 
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FIGURE 6: LONGITUDINAL CHANGE IN FCC COMMISSIONERS’ IDEAL POINT 
ESTIMATES 
 
 
 
 
 
If liberals registered as Republicans and donated to conservative can-
didates so they could be sold by a Democratic President to Senate 
Republicans as genuine cross-party appointees, then we would expect to 
see the light red line (Democratic President, Republican appointee) 
trending downward in later years, as appointees who posed as conserva-
tives pre-confirmation revealed their true liberal selves. Likewise, if con-
servatives registered as Democrats and donated to liberal candidates so 
they could be sold by a Republican President to Senate Democrats, then 
we would expect to see the light blue line (Republican President, 
Democratic appointee) trending upward in later years, as appointees 
who posed as liberals revealed their true conservative selves. And if 
appointees tended to drift in a single direction (a Greenhouse effect at 
multimember agencies), then we would expect the lines to be roughly 
parallel with similar slopes. 
We observe none of these phenomena in Figure 6. For the most 
part, commissioners display consistent ideologies over time. Concerning 
those commissioners for whom we have ideal point estimates both before 
and after their initial appointments, we see only slight, inconsistent 
movement toward more extreme positions post-appointment. 
4. PBR Agencies Versus the Rest of the Executive Branch. — To provide 
broader context for this secular divergence in the ideological 
composition of PBR agencies, we compare ideological preferences of 
appointees to PBR agencies with the ideological preferences of other 
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high-level executive branch policymakers.126 Placing PBR agency 
appointees and other officeholders on the same scale allows us to assess 
the extent to which the observed trend in PBR agencies reflects or 
departs from changes in the ideological composition of executive 
appointees writ large. 
For this analysis, we leverage a dataset created by Professors Adam 
Bonica, Jowei Chen, and Tim Johnson, which contains DIME-based 
CFscores for all available executive appointees between the Reagan and 
Obama Administrations.127 The solid curves in Figures 7(a)–(e) depict 
the ideological distributions of PBR appointees across five presidential 
administrations; the dashed curves depict these distributions for other 
high-level, Senate-confirmed officials.128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 126. High-level officials encompass heads and commissioners of other independent 
agencies, department secretaries, and second- and third-level leaders (typically deputy 
secretaries and assistant secretaries or undersecretaries) in executive departments. All 
positions require Senate confirmation. 
 127. Bonica, Executive Appointees, DIME, supra note 105; see also Bonica, Chen & 
Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping, supra note 105, at 15. To allow for longitudinal 
comparisons across the entire period, we exclude agencies that operated during only part 
of this period, for example, the African Development Foundation, Corporation for 
National and Community Service, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, and U.S. 
Information Agency. 
 128. Figures 7(a)–(e) were generated using the CFscores for 2,318 appointees. 
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FIGURES 7(A)–(E): IDEOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF APPOINTEES TO PBR 
AGENCIES AND OTHER AGENCIES 
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FIGURE 7(B): G.H.W. BUSH 
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FIGURE 7(D): G.W. BUSH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 7(a) through 7(e) show a remarkable development. Figure 
7(a) reports that during the Reagan Administration, the ideological 
distribution of appointees to PBR agencies—including both co-party and 
cross-party appointees—maps closely onto the ideological distribution of 
high-level executive appointees. Both distributions are unimodal, 
clustered around a conservative President’s own CFscore. Figure 7(b) 
provides a similar picture for the George H.W. Bush Administration. 
A change, however, is discernible in the Clinton years. Although 
most Clinton appointees to both PBR agencies and other high-level 
executive positions are clustered around the same left-of-center mode, a 
right-of-center local maximum has begun to develop—but only for 
appointees to PBR agencies. This bimodality becomes more pronounced 
in the George W. Bush Administration (naturally, with the locations of 
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the global and local maxima flipping, as the White House switches from 
Democratic to Republican control). The trend continues in the Obama 
Administration; by the Obama years, the distribution of appointees to 
PBR agencies is almost completely bimodal, with a cluster of appointees 
located approximately at -1 and a second cluster—only slightly smaller—
roughly centered around +1. By contrast, the distribution of other high-
level appointees remains single-peaked, with its mode located near 
President Obama’s CFscore. 
To translate these trends from picture to prose: Our findings suggest 
that PBRs had very little effect on the ideological composition of 
agencies during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations. The 
ideological distribution of PBR agency appointees closely matches the 
distribution of appointees to positions not covered by PBRs. Starting with 
the Clinton Administration, however, a distinct PBR effect appears. 
President Clinton appointed a fair number of conservatives to PBR 
agencies but named very few conservatives to other posts. The PBR effect 
grows even more pronounced under President George W. Bush and 
President Obama. These results confirm our thesis that PBRs do indeed 
bite, but that they have come to bite only relatively recently. 
5. Statutory Versus Informal PBRs. — Our analysis thus far has lumped 
the NLRB with other PBR agencies, even though the NLRB is not subject 
to a formal PBR. The House in 1947 passed legislation that would have 
added a formal partisan balance requirement to the statute governing 
NLRB membership, but the party balance provision was (for reasons not 
explained in the legislative history129) omitted from the version of the bill 
that passed the Senate and became law.130 Nonetheless, there has been a 
“tradition” since the Eisenhower years that Presidents have filled no 
more than three of the NLRB’s five seats with members of their own 
party.131 The informal partisan balance requirement at the NLRB is an 
example of what Professor Adrian Vermeuele has called a “convention of 
                                                                                                                                
 129. H.R. Rep. No. 80-510, at 36–37 (1947) (Conf. Rep.) (noting the party balance 
provision was included in the House bill but not in the conference agreement, and 
offering no explanation for this omission). 
 130. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, sec. 101, § 3(a), 
61 Stat. 136, 139. 
 131. See Matthew M. Bodah, Congress and the National Labor Relations Board: A 
Review of the Recent Past, 22 J. Lab. Res. 699, 700 (2001) (discussing the unwritten 
tradition of bipartisanship and restraint that characterized appointments to the NLRB); 
James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 Comp. Lab. 
L. & Pol’y J. 221, 244 & n.109 (2005) (“Notwithstanding this silence, a tradition has 
developed of appointing both Democrats and Republicans to the Board, with the 
President’s party holding a three-to-two majority of the seats and also the chair.”). The last 
time that the NLRB had more than three members from the same party was August 1956, 
when four Republicans and one Democrat served on the Board; President Eisenhower 
then named a Democrat to replace a retiring Republican. See Members of the NLRB 
Since 1935, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 [http:// 
perma.cc/L7GB-PTN3] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017). 
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agency independence”: an unwritten norm that has come to govern the 
behavior of political actors with respect to the agency.132 
The case of the NLRB allows us to examine whether a partisan 
balance requirement that emerges from convention has the same effect 
on ideological composition as a PBR set forth by statute. Table 4 
compares the ideologies of appointees to the NLRB with the ideologies 
of appointees to the twenty-two agencies with statutory PBRs for which we 
have obtained data from 1979 to 2014. Under Democratic Presidents, 
cross-party appointees to the NLRB appear, on average, to be slightly less 
conservative than cross-party appointees to agencies with statutory PBRs, 
but this difference falls far short of statistical significance (p = 0.945). 
Likewise, under Republican Presidents, cross-party appointees to the 
NLRB appear on average to be slightly less liberal than cross-party 
appointees to agencies with statutory PBRs, but again, this difference is 
not statistically significant (p = 0.849). In short, we find little to suggest 
that the difference between the NLRB’s partisan balance convention and 
the statutory PBRs applicable to other agencies has any effect on 
ideological composition—the NLRB looks much like the statutory PBR 
agencies in terms of the ideological preferences of appointees. 
 
TABLE 4: MEAN IDEOLOGY OF APPOINTEES TO NLRB AND STATUTORY PBR 
AGENCIES 
 
 
NLRB Statutory PBR Agencies 
Co-Party 
Appointees 
Cross-Party 
Appointees 
Co-Party 
Appointees 
Cross-Party 
Appointees 
Democratic 
Presidents 
-1.106 
(0.309) 
0.753 
(0.774) 
-0.898 
(0.531) 
0.776 
(0.520) 
Republican 
Presidents 
0.681 
(0.760) 
-0.341 
(1.052) 
0.863 
(0.309) 
-0.500 
(0.797) 
n = 578. Includes appointments made to the NLRB and twenty-two other agencies 
during the period from 1979 to 2014. Cells report mean CFscores and, in 
parentheses, standard deviations. 
 
Indeed, when we focus on twenty-first century appointments, we find 
evidence that the partisan balance convention at the NLRB has as much, 
if not more, bite than statutory PBRs elsewhere. Since 2000, Republicans 
appointed by Democratic Presidents to the NLRB have been, on average, 
even more conservative—and Democrats appointed by Republican 
Presidents to the NLRB even more liberal—than those Presidents’ cross-
                                                                                                                                
 132. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 
1163, 1166 (2013). 
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party appointees to agencies with statutory PBRs.133 This conclusion, how-
ever, comes with an important caveat. Our dataset includes CFscores for 
only six cross-party appointees—three Democrats appointed by President 
George W. Bush and three Republicans appointed by Presidents Clinton 
or Obama—between 2000 and 2014. This relative lack of data on cross-
party appointees to the NLRB may not be coincidental. The Board has 
suffered from persistent, politically motivated vacancies during the past 
several administrations.134 Whereas Congress permits appointees to other 
agencies to serve beyond the expiration of their terms until their succes-
sors are confirmed,135 NLRB members are not authorized to serve in an 
acting capacity.136 That NLRB seats remain vacant until filled may 
provide senators with an additional incentive to delay acting on 
nominations to the Board (beyond their usual incentives to do so for 
agencies when such delay leaves the existing appointees temporarily in 
place). Accordingly, it is possible that partisan gamesmanship is 
occurring with respect to cross-party appointees to the NLRB—it just 
occurs at an earlier stage in the appointments process and thus is not 
captured by the CFscores for those individuals that make it onto the 
Board. 
In sum, the partisan balance norm that exists by “convention” or 
“tradition” at the NLRB appears to be driving a gap between co-party 
                                                                                                                                
 133. Further, when the analysis is limited from 2000 to 2014, the results also lend 
support to the conventional wisdom that the NLRB is an unusually politicized agency. See 
Brudney, supra note 131, at 223–24; Samuel Estreicher, ‘Depoliticizing’ the National 
Labor Relations Board: Administrative Steps, 64 Emory L.J. 1611, 1613 (2015) (explaining 
that, in reference to the NLRB, “the perception of a ‘politicized’ agency seems stronger 
than ever”); Julius G. Getman, The NLRB: What Went Wrong and Should We Try to Fix 
It?, 64 Emory L.J. 1495, 1496 (2015) (“The Board has become a controversial, often 
politicized, agency whose best efforts are denounced by politicians and often overruled by 
the Supreme Court.”). For each President–appointee combination, the mean NLRB 
appointee is more extreme than the corresponding cell in the table for the other agencies 
with PBRs. 
 134. See Mark Landler & Steven Greenhouse, Vacancies and Partisan Fighting Put 
Labor Relations Agency in Legal Limbo, N.Y. Times (July 15, 2013), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/us/politics/vacancies-and-partisan-fighting-put-labor-
relations-agency-in-legal-limbo.html?mcubz=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing the Senate’s refusal to confirm President Bush’s and then President Obama’s 
nominees). 
 135. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) (2012) (providing that a CFTC commissioner 
“shall hold office for a term of five years and until his successor is appointed . . . except 
that he shall not so continue to serve beyond the expiration of the next session of 
Congress subsequent to the expiration of said fixed term of office”); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) 
(2012) (providing similar restrictions on term lengths for the SEC); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7171(b)(1) (2012) (FERC); 47 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012) (FCC). 
 136. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3349b, 3349c(1)(A) (2012) (specifying that appointees to 
multimember independent agencies cannot serve in a holdover or acting position unless 
otherwise statutorily authorized); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) (specifying that there is no 
provision in the NLRB’s organic statute for continuation of service beyond the length of 
the fixed term). 
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and cross-party appointees that is broadly similar to the gap between co-
party and cross-party appointees at agencies with statutory PBRs. The bite 
of PBRs does not appear to depend on whether these provisions are 
written into law. But whether we are dealing with a statutory PBR or a 
PBR that arises from convention, the puzzle remains as to why these 
requirements do anything at all to shape the ideological composition of 
multimember agencies. The next section turns to that question and to 
the implications of our results for various theories of PBRs’ efficacy. 
C. Market Forces and Appointee Selection 
This section reevaluates this Article’s two main causal explanations 
for the efficacy of PBRs—the supply-side theory and the demand-side 
theory—in light of our empirical analysis. It also considers (and largely 
rejects) alternative hypotheses that might account for the topline results 
and time trends observed above. 
1. Supply-Side Constraints. — Our results are broadly consistent with 
the supply-side theory, which holds that Presidents are constrained in 
their selection by the ideological composition of the pool of potential 
cross-party appointees. As the political class from which the memberships 
of boards and commissions are typically drawn becomes more 
ideologically polarized along party lines, it becomes increasingly difficult 
for a President to identify competent individuals whose ideological 
preferences track the President’s own but whose party affiliation does 
not. Presidents are reactive in this narrative; they appoint bona fide cross-
party members because these are the only competent potential 
appointees that “the market” supplies. 
The time trends in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) support this theory. The 
appointment of bona fide cross-party members gradually becomes more 
prevalent from the late 1970s through the mid-2010s, while simultane-
ously, the political classes gradually became more ideologically distinct 
along party lines. While it might seem surprising that a motivated 
Democratic President cannot find a liberal Republican for a cross-party 
seat or that a motivated Republican President cannot find a conservative 
Democrat, the supply-side theory becomes more plausible if one 
supposes that Presidents care about competence as well as ideological 
alignment. To be sure, a Democratic President might still be able to find 
someone in a nation of more than 300 million people who shares the 
President’s liberal views but registers as an independent or a Republican, 
and a Republican President might still be able to find someone who shares 
that President’s conservative views but registers as an independent or a 
Democrat. Yet while we observe past Presidents drawing cross-party 
appointees from the pools of liberal Republicans and conservative 
Democrats when these pools were much larger, we see relatively few 
cross-party appointments of these types in recent years. 
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2. Demand-Side Constraints. — The demand-side theory, by contrast, 
finds much weaker support here. Recall that this theory views senators as 
the “consumers” in the confirmation market to whom the President must 
“sell” her favored nominees. One could imagine that Democratic 
Presidents may want to appoint liberal Republicans to Republican-
designated seats and that Republican Presidents may have the inverse 
desire, but that opposition-party senators use their advice-and-consent au-
thority to block the appointments of moderates to party-specific seats. 
The demand-side theory therefore holds that the presence of bona fide 
cross-party commissioners on PBR agencies is attributable to pressure 
from cross-party senators. 
If this narrative is accurate, one would expect Presidents to appoint 
genuine cross-partisans to cross-party seats only when cross-party senators 
are sufficiently powerful to compel Presidents to do so. By contrast, when 
cross-party senators do not have enough votes to block a party-member-
in-name-only nominee, Presidents will have free rein to appoint 
milquetoast partisans to cross-party seats. Essentially, one would expect 
the ideological distance between appointing Presidents and cross-party 
appointees to be positively correlated with cross-party senators’ power to 
deny confirmation to disfavored nominees. 
When do cross-party senators have the power to deny confirmation? 
One possibility is that the ability to block cloture—and thus deny a vote 
on a nominee—provides cross-party senators with a means of ensuring 
that the Presidents appoint bona fide cross-party members to PBR 
agencies. This explanation, however, cannot explain the time trend in 
Figures 4(a) and 4(b)—that PBRs have come to exert stronger effects 
over time. During virtually the entire study period, both parties held a 
sufficient number of seats to block a nominee under Senate filibuster 
rules.137 Yet, as Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show, cross-party appointees did 
not become ideologically distinct, at conventionally accepted levels of 
statistical significance, until late in the period. 
                                                                                                                                
 137. For almost the entire period from 1979 to 2014, confirmation of executive 
branch nominees required the assent of sixty senators, which is the number needed to 
invoke cloture under Senate Rule XXII. See Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 113-
8, Rule XXII, at 15–17 (2013) (providing that three-fifths of senators are required to 
invoke cloture, i.e., to vote to limit further consideration of a pending question, thereby 
permitting the question to be put to a majority vote). On November 21, 2013, the Senate 
reinterpreted Rule XXII to allow fifty-one votes to invoke cloture for nominees to 
positions other than the Supreme Court. Walter J. Oleszek, Cong. Research Serv., R44709, 
Changing the Senate Cloture Rule at the Start of a New Congress 8–9 (2016), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44709.pdf [http://perma.cc/NER9-Y6WR]. Accordingly, a 
unified opposition party holding at least forty-one Senate seats prior to that date, or fifty-
one seats thereafter, could block a nominee. See id. (describing the Rule XXII 
reinterpretation and the subsequent need for only fifty-one votes to confirm a nominee 
other than one to the Supreme Court). This new interpretation applies only if the vote 
occurs pursuant to a specific procedural posture. Id. The opposition party needs fifty-one 
votes, rather than fifty, to block a nominee after November 21, 2013, because, in the event 
of a fifty-fifty tie, the Vice President would vote for confirmation. 
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Further, a recent change in Senate rules allows for a simple test of 
the Senate’s potential role in giving PBRs their bite—and the results 
suggest that role is limited. On November 21, 2013, the leadership of the 
Senate Democratic majority exercised the “nuclear option” and altered 
the chamber’s interpretation of Senate Rule XXII to reduce the number 
of votes needed to invoke cloture for nominees to positions other than 
Supreme Court justiceships from sixty to fifty-one (or fifty, with the Vice 
President as a tiebreaker).138 For only the second time during the study 
period, a unified cross-party (here, the Republicans) did not possess 
sufficient votes to prevent a Senate majority from invoking cloture on a 
confirmation vote for a nominee to a PBR agency. A Senate-focused 
theory of PBRs’ bite would predict that President Obama’s appointees to 
cross-party seats would tend to be more liberal after November 21, 2013. 
In reality, however, appointees to cross-party PBR seats in the twelve 
months after this date are 0.179 points more conservative than appointees 
to cross-party PBR seats in the prior twelve months—a difference that is 
in line with the long-term year-to-year increases in ideological distance 
between the President and cross-party appointees displayed in Figure 
4(b). 
The other period during which a unified cross-party (again, the 
Republicans) did not possess sufficient votes to block a Senate majority 
from invoking cloture was July 7, 2009 through February 4, 2010.139 That 
period was bookmarked, on one end, by the seating of Senator Al 
Franken of Minnesota as the sixtieth Democratic senator following a long 
recount, and, on the other end, by the seating of Senator Scott Brown, a 
Republican from Massachusetts, after a special election that reduced the 
Democratic caucus to fifty-nine.140 During that interval, the Obama 
Administration’s appointees to cross-party seats were 0.111 points more 
liberal than those in the period between President Obama’s inauguration 
and Senator Franken’s swearing in. This slightly more liberal tilt in cross-
party appointees during a period in which Democrats controlled the 
White House and held a supermajority in the Senate hints at a demand-
side effect. 
Trends following Senator Brown’s seating, however, cut against the 
demand-side theory. Following Brown’s seating, Senate Democrats saw 
                                                                                                                                
 138. See Oleszek, supra note 137, at 8–9. 
 139. See Monica Davey & Carl Hulse, Franken’s Win Bolsters Democratic Grip in 
Senate, N.Y. Times (June 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/us/politics/ 
01minnesota.html?mcubz=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that Franken’s 
seating would give the Democrats sixty seats in the Senate, which is sufficient to overcome 
a filibuster); Janet Hook, Republican Scott Brown of Massachusetts Sworn in to Senate, 
L.A. Times (Feb. 4, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/04/nation/la-na-
brown5-2010feb05 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that Brown’s seating 
would reduce the Democrats’ numbers to fifty-nine, depriving them of their ability to avert 
a Republican filibuster). 
 140. See Davey & Hulse, supra note 139; Hook, supra note 139. 
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their filibuster-proof supermajority end. The demand-side theory 
predicts that cross-party appointees would trend conservative based on 
Senate Republicans’ relatively greater power during this period. Yet in 
the twelve months following Brown’s seating, cross-party appointees were 
0.093 points more liberal than they were during the interval in which the 
Democrats held a supermajority. This slight liberal trend continued 
through the date on which Senate Democratic leadership exercised the 
nuclear option. 
Table 5 compares the actual trends in cross-party appointee ideology 
around these demand-side pivotal moments with the effects that we 
might predict on the basis of the demand-side theory. (In all intervals in 
the table, cross-party appointees are Obama appointees to Republican 
seats.) In only one of the three intervals—roughly the odds one might 
expect from three coin flips—does reality line up with the predictions 
generated by the demand-side theory. While we cannot entirely rule out 
the possibility that the opposition party’s ability to block a nomination 
has a modest effect on the ideological composition of multimember 
agencies, the evidence from these Obama-era shocks casts significant 
doubt on the demand-side story. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: USING DEMAND SHOCKS TO ASSESS THE DEMAND-SIDE 
HYPOTHESIS 
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Intervals 
Obama 
Inaugurated–
Franken 
Seated 
Franken 
Seated–
Brown 
Seated 
Brown 
Seated–
Nuclear 
Option 
Exercised 
Nuclear 
Option 
Exercised–
End of 
Democratic 
Majority 
Demand-side 
theory 
predicts cross-
party 
appointees 
will be . . . 
N/A 
more 
liberal 
than 
previous 
period 
more 
conservative 
than previous 
period 
more liberal 
than previous 
period 
Cross-party 
appointees 
actually 
were . . . 
N/A 
more 
liberal 
than 
previous 
period 
more liberal 
than previous 
period 
more 
conservative 
than previous 
period 
 
But perhaps the demand-side mechanism is subtler than simply 
whether a completely unified cross-party could prevent a floor vote. After 
all, senators rarely utilize their Rule XXII prerogative for nominees to 
executive branch positions.141 Of those executive branch nominations 
that are reported out of committee, only 4% die on the floor, a figure 
that includes failures to pass a cloture motion to end a filibuster, 
filibuster threats, and individual senators’ holds on nominations.142 By 
contrast, Senate committees fail to report out approximately 20% of 
nominations, which effectively ends these nominees’ chances of 
confirmation in most cases.143 The role that majority-party-dominated 
committees play in the process suggests that a Senate party’s influence 
over nominations is far broader—and perhaps harder to define—than 
simply the binary matter of whether the party (if completely unified) 
possesses forty-one votes to deny cloture. 
To test the hypothesis that the power of the cross-party in the Senate 
influences the President’s choice of moderates or ideologues for cross-
party seats on PBR agencies, we regress the ideological distance between 
each cross-party appointee and the appointing President (“CFscore 
Difference”144) on the cross-party’s seat share in the Senate at the time of 
                                                                                                                                
 141. See Bonica, Chen & Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping, supra note 105, at 10 (noting 
that “many scholars have viewed floor votes as an afterthought” in the context of executive 
branch appointments and that very few nominees fail floor votes). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Recall that positive values of CFscore in a Democratic (Republican) 
administration indicate that the mean appointee is more conservative (liberal) than the 
appointing President. 
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each appointment (Model 1). As an alternative specification, we also re-
gress CFscore Difference on whether the cross-party held a Senate 
majority at the time of the appointment (Model 2); “Divided 
Government” is coded as 1 if the cross-party held at least fifty-one Senate 
seats.145 Finally, Models 3 and 4 add a time-trend variable into the mix. 
“Time” signifies the number of years since the inception of the series in 
1979 that a given cross-party appointee was confirmed. Including both 
“Time” and either “Cross-Party Seat Share” or “Divided Government” in 
these final two models enables us to pit the supply-side and demand-side 
hypotheses directly against each other. 
 
TABLE 6: SENATE COMPOSITION AND CROSS-APPOINTEE SELECTION 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Cross-Party 
Seat Share 
-0.036 
(0.027) 
 
N/A 
 
-0.027** 
(0.009) 
N/A 
Divided 
Government 
N/A (0.227) N/A 
-0.202* 
(0.100) 
Time (Years 
Since 1979) 
N/A N/A 
0.043*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.044*** 
(0.005) 
 
n = 216. Unit of analysis: cross-party appointees to twenty-three agencies during 
the period from 1979 to 2014. Carter years include 1979 and 1980 only; Obama 
years include 2009 to 2014 only. Dependent variable: CFscore Difference. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the two-year Congress-level are given in parentheses. 
Table includes fixed effects for each presidency (baseline category: Carter 
Administration). *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. All models are estimated via 
OLS regression.  
 
Table 6 shows no support for the hypothesis that the cross-party’s 
power in the Senate encourages the President to choose cross-party 
appointees to PBR agencies whose views are further from the President’s 
own. The coefficient estimates for “Cross-Party Seat Share” and “Divided 
Government” are negative in all four models (and statistically significant 
in two of the four), indicating the President selects cross-party appointees 
                                                                                                                                
 145. To create both Cross-Party Seat Share and Divided Government, independent 
senators who caucus with a particular party are classified as members of that party. 
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who are closer to her ideal point when the cross-party is more powerful in 
the Senate. These negative estimates are precisely the opposite of the 
demand-side theory’s predication: that a stronger cross-party in the 
Senate should pull cross-party appointees in its direction and away from 
the President’s ideal point. 
By contrast, the coefficient estimates for “Time” are positive and 
statistically significant in both of the models in which they appear 
(Models 3 and 4). As the series progresses—and as partisan sort 
proceeds—cross-party appointees steadily become more extreme. When 
tested against the demand-side theory, the supply-side theory retains its 
explanatory power. 
None of this is to suggest that individual senators are irrelevant to 
the selection of cross-party appointees.146 In particular, the leader of the 
opposition party in the Senate (the Minority Leader when the President’s 
party controls the Senate, or the Majority Leader when it does not) often 
plays an outsized role in the process.147 For example, Senate Republican 
leader Bob Dole sent recommendations for cross-party appointments to 
President Clinton throughout Clinton’s first term.148 Dole’s successor as 
Senate Republican leader, Trent Lott, continued the practice149—in one 
case clashing with fellow Republican Senator Orrin Hatch regarding the 
respective roles of the leader and Senate committee chairs in cross-party 
appointments.150 Senate Democratic leaders Tom Daschle and Harry 
                                                                                                                                
 146. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only, N.Y. 
Times (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/business/independent-
agencies-sometimes-in-name-only.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that 
senior senators have been “instrumental” in the selection of SEC commissioners in recent 
years). 
 147. See id. (noting that, in the early 2000s, the expectation was that the opposition-
party leaders would choose cross-party nominees). 
 148. See Kamen, supra note 58; see also Dina Elboghdady, Owen Sees ICC Post as 
Capital Opportunity, Orange County Reg., Feb. 5, 1995 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (noting that Clinton’s cross-party appointee to the ICC had been recommended 
by Dole); Lynn Stevens Hume, Dole Urges Clinton to Name Unger, Banking Committee 
Lawyer, to SEC Post, Bond Buyer, Sept. 19, 1995 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(noting that Dole had recommended that Clinton name a Republican Senate aide to a 
cross-party seat on the SEC); John Maggs, GOP Lawmakers Oppose Bragg as ITC 
Chairman, J. Com. (May 25, 1994), http://www.joc.com/gop-lawmakers-oppose-bragg-itc-
chairman_19940525.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that other 
Republican lawmakers were upset with Dole’s recommendation for a cross-party seat on 
the USITC). 
 149. See, e.g., Senate Spat over Lott’s FCC Picks, Wired (Apr. 10, 1997), 
http://www.wired.com/1997/04/senate-spat-over-lotts-fcc-picks (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (detailing Senator Lott’s recommendations for Republican FCC 
commissioners). 
 150. See Michael Grunwald, Sentencing Panel’s Own Terms Are Up, Wash. Post (Aug. 
28, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/08/28/sentencing-
panels-own-terms-are-up/da055846-230d-448f-b33c11f596cb1f4d/?utm_term=.47875b15ee4f 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting the conflict between Lott and Hatch). The 
Sentencing Commission, an advisory panel, is located in the judicial rather than executive 
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Reid frequently forwarded names for cross-party appointments to 
President George W. Bush.151 According to one account, Senate 
Republican leader Mitch McConnell made a particularly concerted effort 
to advance conservative ideologues for cross-party seats under President 
Obama, whereas earlier leaders often selected nominees on the basis of 
home-state connections or recommendations from other caucus 
members.152 Most recently, a spokesman for Minority Leader Charles 
Schumer said in March 2017 that Senate Democrats “intend to assert our 
prerogative on nominees as always has been done,”153 and Schumer has 
advanced several Democrats for cross-party appointments in the months 
since President Trump took office.154 
But while the leader of the opposition party in the Senate no doubt 
plays an important role in the selection process, the widening ideological 
gap between co-party and cross-party appointees should not necessarily 
be attributed to Senate leadership. First, the role of Senate leaders is 
purely advisory. As a formal matter, any provision that vested a Senate 
leader with the statutory power to choose an executive branch officer 
would violate the Appointments Clause of Article II.155 And as a practical 
matter, Presidents do not always follow the suggestions of Senate leaders. 
                                                                                                                                
branch and so is excluded from our empirical analysis. About the Commission, U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n, http://www.ussc.gov/ [http://perma.cc/ZNZ9-Z47M] (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2017). 
 151. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Democrats Push S.E.C. Official for Commission Seat, 
N.Y. Times (May 18, 2005), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 
9E0CE2DA1639F93BA25756C0A9639C8B63 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Judith 
Burns, Daschle Recommends Hispanic-American Candidate for SEC, Dow Jones News 
Serv. (Jan. 7, 2002) (available in full on Lexis Advance and on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); Michele Heller, In Brief: Daschle Recommends Goldschmid for SEC, Am. Banker 
(Jan. 30, 2002), http://americanbanker.com/news/in-brief-daschle-recommends-
goldschmid-for-sec (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Mark Wigfield, Sen. Daschle 
Recommends Democratic Aide for FCC Post, Dow Jones News Serv. (Nov. 15, 2001) 
(available in full on Lexis Advance and on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 152. See Daniel Foster, Agent McConnell, Nat’l Rev. (June 3, 2013), http:// 
www.nationalreview.com/sites/default/files/uploaded/20130603.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 153. Kelcee Griffis, Trump Nixes Rosenworcel Nomination to Return to FCC, 
Law360 (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.law360.com/articles/897483/trump-nixes-rosenworcel-
nomination-to-return-to-fcc [http://perma.cc/8KCD-UE82] (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting a Schumer spokesman). 
 154. See, e.g., David Lieberman, President Trump Renominates Jessica Rosenworcel 
to FCC, Deadline (June 14, 2017), http://deadline.com/2017/06/president-trump-
renominates-jessica-rosenworcel-fcc-1202113089 [http://perma.cc/NR34-XS4X] (noting 
that Schumer recommended a cross-party nominee for President Trump); Harper Neidig, 
Schumer Recommends Consumer Advocate for FTC, Hill (May 8, 2017), http:// 
thehill.com/regulation/finance/332535-schumer-recommends-consumer-advocate-for-ftc 
[http://perma.cc/X9NA-RAD8] (noting that Schumer recommended someone to fill the 
Democratic opening on the FTC). 
 155. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127–37 (1976) (striking down a provision in the 
Federal Election Campaign Act that purported to authorize the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and Speaker of the House to choose four members of the FEC). 
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For example, then-Senate Minority Leader Dole complained that 
President Clinton often chose “Clinton Republicans” for cross-party seats 
and ignored Dole’s recommendations.156 Likewise, then-Senate Majority 
Leader Reid complained in 2008 that although he and President George 
W. Bush “were able to work cooperatively on [cross-party] nominations” 
through most of Bush’s second term, “there has been a notable shift in 
the President’s stance on these nominations from one of cooperation to 
intransigence,” with the Bush White House rejecting several of Reid’s 
suggestions during the final year of the Bush presidency.157 
Second, when Senate leaders recommend nominees, they do so in 
the shadow of the White House’s range of acceptable options. Thus, even 
when the President follows the opposition party leader’s recommenda-
tion, it would be a mistake to attribute the appointment to the 
opposition party leader alone. Cross-party appointments often come at 
the end of a back-and-forth process whereby the leader proposes a 
nominee to a cross-party seat and the White House either accepts the 
nomination or offers a counterproposal.158 These negotiations are 
sometimes bound up in bargaining between the White House and 
senators over issues unrelated or tangential to the appointment in 
question.159 
Third, insofar as cross-party appointments are driven by the opposi-
tion party’s Senate leader, we would expect that leader’s influence to be 
at its peak when the opposition party holds more seats in the Senate. Yet 
as illustrated by Table 6, our data do not bear out that prediction. 
Remarkably, the extent to which Presidents choose genuine cross-
partisans for multimember commission seats has no apparent 
relationship to the political power of the opposition party leader. 
Fourth and finally, while the median Senate Democrat and median 
Senate Republican have grown farther apart ideologically over the course 
                                                                                                                                
 156. Kamen, supra note 58. 
 157. Martin Kady II, Reid Letter Shows White House Rejected Nominee Compromise, 
Politico: Politico Now Blog (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.politico.com/blogs/ 
politico-now/2008/02/reid-letter-shows-white-house-rejected-nominee-compromise-006621 
[http://perma.cc/K89G-G8E4] (quoting a letter from Reid to White House Chief of Staff 
Joshua Bolton). Reid’s letter also made the surprising—and flatly false—claim that “I have 
the statutory authority to make recommendations to the President for Democratic positions 
on independent boards and commissions.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 158. Telephone Interview with Ronald Weich, Former Chief Counsel to Senator Reid 
(Aug. 29, 2017) (call notes on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also, G. Calvin 
MacKenzie, Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments 
Process 33 (2011) (describing “[p]ainstaking negotiations between the White House and 
Senate stakeholders” regarding nominees to the FCC in 1997, as well as similar bargaining 
between President Clinton and Senate Republican leaders regarding a cross-party 
appointee to the FEC in 1999). 
 159. Email from Senator Jon Kyl, Former Senate Minority Whip, to Daniel Hemel, 
Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. (Aug. 25, 2017) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he minority is always looking for leverage, and nominations for 
anything work.”). 
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of our study period, we see much less ideological movement among the 
parties’ respective Senate leaders. Figure 8, below, compares the 
CFscores for the Senate Democratic and Republican leaders, denoted 
with bold lines, with the median appointees to Democratic and 
Republican seats on agencies with PBRs; appointees to co-party seats are 
denoted with thin, solid lines, whereas appointees to cross-party seats are 
denoted with dotted lines. As the figure shows, changes over time in the 
median CFscores of cross-party appointees bear little discernable 
relationship to changes in the CFscores of Senate leaders. For example, 
Mitch McConnell, who led the Senate Republicans through the Obama 
years, has a CFscore that is 0.030 points lower (less conservative) than 
Howard Baker, the Senate Republican leader under Carter, whereas the 
median cross-party (Republican) appointee under Obama is 0.386 points 
more conservative than the median cross-party appointee under Carter. 
In other words, Republicans appointed by Democratic Presidents grew 
much more conservative even while the Senate Republican leader (as 
measured by CFscore) grew slightly less so. Likewise, Harry Reid, who led 
the Senate Democrats during George W. Bush’s second term, has a 
CFscore that is only 0.194 points lower than that of Robert Byrd, the 
Senate Democratic leader under Reagan, while the median CFscore for 
George W. Bush’s cross-party (Democratic) appointees is 1.190 points 
lower than the median CFscore for Reagan’s cross-party appointees. That 
is, Democrats appointed by Republican Presidents grew substantially 
more liberal even while the CFscore for the Senate Democratic leader 
barely budged. In sum, we find little evidence to suggest that the 
divergence between co-party and cross-party appointees over our study 
period can be explained by an increase in the power of opposition party 
senators or Senate leaders in the selection process. 
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FIGURE 8: SENATE LEADERS AND APPOINTEES TO AGENCIES WITH PBRS 
3. Search Costs. — Along with increased partisan sort, another broad 
social phenomenon that may have increased PBRs’ bite occurred during 
this period: an information technology revolution that slashed the cost of 
obtaining data on nominees. Forty years ago, learning a potential appoin-
tee’s detailed political views might require using one’s Rolodex to 
contact members of the appointee’s social or professional circle and 
investing the time and political capital to convince these mutual 
connections to speak candidly (and, naturally, as a prerequisite, one 
would need to have the connections and status to pull this off). Today, 
one can procure similar information with a few keystrokes—as we did. As 
a result, a wide variety of interested parties—including Senate staffers, 
activists, and journalists—can inexpensively obtain information 
regarding the ideologies of potential appointees. In light of the 
reduction in the costs associated with obtaining this information, 
perhaps the President’s ability to present conservative Democrats and 
liberal Republicans as stealth nominees has diminished. 
While this search-costs hypothesis has some appeal, we are skeptical 
that it is driving our results for three reasons. First, this hypothesis under-
states the amount of information concerning potential appointees’ dona-
tions that was publicly accessible throughout this period. The FEC has a 
long-established reputation for facilitating public access to its data.160 For 
                                                                                                                                
 160. See R. Sam Garrett, Cong. Research Serv., R44318, The Federal Election 
Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress 17 (2015), http:// 
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44318.pdf [http://perma.cc/KLU2-MHMU] (“[T]he FEC 
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virtually the entire period, the FEC considered reports on receipts and 
FEC-generated indices of these receipts to be subject to the Freedom of 
Information Act and thus endeavored to provide “the fullest possible dis-
closure” to the public.161 In 1980, Congress required the FEC to make 
reports submitted by campaigns “available for public inspection” and to 
“develop a filing, coding, and cross-indexing system” to facilitate public 
access.162 The FEC met this obligation that same year.163 Since 1996, the 
FEC has provided to the public comprehensive electronic records of 
campaign contributions dating back to the late 1970s.164 In 1998, the FEC 
debuted an internet-based search function that allows users to search the 
FEC’s online database for specific donors by name.165 
Access to campaign contributions data likely was more difficult prior 
to the current era of searchable online databases. Still, interested parties 
had the means to access this information throughout the study period. 
Even during the years in which identifying contributors required review-
ing indices of campaign contributions, the stakes to Presidents, senators, 
and affected interest groups of placing a “disloyal” appointee on a board 
or commission likely were sufficiently high—and the resources available 
to these individuals and entities sufficiently deep—to outweigh these 
relatively modest search costs. 
Second, political donations are but one of several ways to convey an 
individual’s partisan affiliation. Presidents and senators could employ 
many other screens to divine potential appointees’ partisan affiliations: 
for instance, whether an individual consistently votes in party primaries, 
has a record of volunteering for political campaigns, or participates in a 
political party or party-connected group. Indeed, the secular decline in 
mass participation in civic activity over the past several generations 
                                                                                                                                
generally is praised for its role in publicizing campaign finance data.”); Jeremy Gaunt, A 
Rocky Decade Later, the FEC Gets Little Respect, Campaign Prac. Rep., Feb. 11, 1985, at 
1, 2 (“[M]ost . . . are willing to credit the agency with at least one major success. . . . [T]he 
FEC has built on earlier attempts to make campaign finance data open to public scrutiny 
and has made disclosure of campaign dollars an accepted and expected part of the 
electoral process.”). 
 161. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 5.2(a), 5.4(a)(1) (2017). For versions of the rule in effect 
between 1980 and 2010, see 65 Fed. Reg. 9201, 9207 (Feb. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 11 
C.F.R. pt. 5); 52 Fed. Reg. 39,213 (Oct. 21, 1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 23,638 (June 24, 1987); 50 
Fed. Reg. 50,778 (Dec. 12, 1985); 45 Fed Reg. 31,292 (May 13, 1980). But see 44 Fed. Reg. 
33,368 (June 8, 1979) (stating that FOIA does not apply to reports of receipts and related 
indices). 
 162. Act of Jan. 8, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-187, sec. 109, § 311(a)(3)–(4), 93 Stat. 1339, 
1362. 
 163. Telephone Interview with Senior Pub. Affairs Specialist, supra note 9. 
 164. Press Release, FEC, supra note 10. 
 165. Id. 
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suggests that, in some respects, it may have been easier to discern an 
individual’s partisan affiliation in 1979 than in 2014.166 
Third, we construct what should be a relatively easy test for the 
search-costs hypothesis—and obtain null results. This test exploits the 
FEC’s introduction of a search function for its online database of 
campaign contributions on July 21, 1998, which constituted the single 
greatest reduction in search costs during this period. If the search-costs 
hypothesis is doing any significant work, we would expect to see it here. 
Yet we do not. 
Model 1 in Table 7, below, is similar to the regression models 
presented in Table 6, above, except that here, we add a dummy variable 
denoting whether the nomination occurred after the search function for 
the FEC’s online database became publicly accessible on July 21, 1998.167 
A positive, statistically significant estimate for this coefficient would 
support the alternative hypothesis that greater access to information 
reduced the White House’s ability to get a “cross-partisan in name only” 
past opposition party senators. Model 1, however, shows a null result. 
Model 2 tests a slight variation on the alternative hypothesis. What if 
interested parties gradually began to adapt to the FEC website’s new 
search function, whether because they learned about the function over 
time through word of mouth or because old-guard staffers were secularly 
replaced with more internet-savvy political operatives? Instead of a 
discrete jump in effect size following the rollout of the search function, 
we would expect the time trend in the dependent variable to pick up 
speed after July 21, 1998. In other words, we would expect a positive 
coefficient on the interaction of the “date of nomination” and 
“nomination after July 21, 1998” variables, which tests for this 
phenomenon. As Model 2 shows, however, the coefficient on the 
interaction term is statistically insignificant and, in fact, weakly 
negative.168 In other words, we find little evidence that the ideological 
                                                                                                                                
 166. Further, to the extent that members of Congress are consulted in executive 
appointments, the fraying personal connections between legislators and their individual 
constituents present an additional impediment to evaluating a potential appointee’s 
partisan loyalty that is more significant in the later years of the study period. Compare 
Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Home Style: House Members in Their Districts 31–35 (1978) 
(looking at how House members “showed a good deal of personal attentiveness to their 
districts” to “enlarge their political support at home”), with Richard F. Fenno, The 
Challenge of Congressional Representation 10–12 (2013) (noting the continued lack of 
scholarly attention to how and if representatives connect with their constituents to gain 
their trust and support). 
 167. Observations in Table 7 are limited to the 145 cross-party appointees for whom 
we were able to obtain the exact date of nomination. 
 168. We also ran a series of placebo tests, substituting July 21 of the years 1993 to 1997 
and 1999 to 2007 in place of the “Nomination after July 21, 1998” variable and interaction-
term component. These dates have no special relevance; we included them simply to 
determine whether the coefficient estimates in models including these dates differ in any 
meaningful way from the estimates reported in Table 7. The results of these placebo tests 
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distance between the President and cross-party appointees increased at a 
faster pace after the FEC’s website search rollout. 
 
TABLE 7: EFFECTS OF FEC SEARCH FUNCTIONALITY ON CROSS-APPOINTEE 
SELECTION 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Divided Government 
-0.304 
(0.155) 
-0.332 
(0.170) 
Date of Nomination 
0.042** 
(0.015) 
0.045* 
(0.017) 
Nomination after July 21, 1998? 
0.036 
(0.272) 
40.636 
(98.771) 
Date of Nomination * Nomination 
after July 21, 1998? (interaction 
term) 
N/A 
 
-0.020 
(0.049) 
 
n = 145. Unit of analysis: cross-party appointees during the period from 1979 to 2014 
for whom we know the exact date of nomination (a subset of the dataset used in 
previous models). Dependent variable: CFscore Difference. signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 
0.01, * p < 0.05. All models are estimated via OLS regression. Parameter estimates for 
the intercepts are omitted. 
 
To sum up so far: Our results are consistent with a supply-side story 
in which partisan sort starting in the 1980s tightened the relationship be-
tween party affiliation and ideology, and so the preferences of cross-party 
appointees increasingly diverged from those of the appointing President. 
                                                                                                                                
are substantially similar to those reported in Table 7 (although the “Divided Government” 
variable lacks statistical significance in most of these placebo models, as expected). 
To determine whether a discontinuity in cross-appointee ideology exists around July 
21, 1998, we constructed a regression-discontinuity model. However, a relative lack of 
observations around the July 21, 1998 cut-point impeded the analysis; using any reasonable 
set of parameter assumptions, the rdbwselect function in R recommended bandwidths of 
approximately two years—hardly a knife-edge. Using this bandwidth, the model reported a 
statistically significant, positive discontinuity at the cut-point. But we do not put much 
stock in this result; given the unacceptably large bandwidth size, the model likely is picking 
up the well-documented time trend and misreporting it as a “knife-edge” discontinuous 
jump. 
Finally, we constructed a regression-kink model, which tests for a discontinuous 
change in slope, rather than an upward shift in the regression curve, at around this date. 
The theory here is that interested parties may have learned about (and learned how to 
use) the FEC’s searchable database gradually, and therefore we might expect a change in 
the rate of growth in the ideological gap after this date, rather than an abrupt increase. 
This model reported null results, but, once again, serious bandwidth selection issues 
prevent firm conclusions. 
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Our results are less consistent with a demand-side story in which the 
power of the opposition party in the Senate (or the influence of its 
leader) drives change over time in the ideological composition of 
multimember agencies. Finally, we find no support for the hypothesis 
that an Internet-induced reduction in search costs has prevented recent 
Presidents from filling cross-party seats with individuals whose campaign 
contributions reveal that these appointees themselves are out of step with 
their party of registration. 
4. Identity Signaling. — Finally, the notion that appointment-seeking 
members donate solely to convey that they are loyal party members may 
bear on this analysis. Consider, for instance, a highly regarded product 
safety lawyer angling for a seat on the CPSC. Her qualifications are 
unimpeachable, but her involvement in partisan politics is either trivial 
or dated.169 She may therefore benefit from donating to her party’s 
candidates solely to convey that she is a member of that party. This 
rationale stands apart from the sincere-versus-strategic dichotomy 
discussed in section II.B.3. Although this behavior obviously is not a 
sincere expression of closely held beliefs, neither is it strategic in the 
sense that it is designed to misrepresent an individual’s ideological 
preferences. It simply broadcasts: “I am a member of this team.” 
If this motivation for political giving is widely held, then changes in 
appointees’ ideal point estimates over time might not capture genuine 
changes in their political views. Rather, if members of the political class 
donate mechanistically to candidates on their party’s ticket, and the ideo-
logical composition of the ticket changes over time as a result of partisan 
sort among candidates, then the observed longitudinal changes in 
appointees’ ideal point estimates would be epiphenomenal. Phrased an-
other way, whereas a Washington lawyer could show loyalty to the 
Republican Party in 1970 by donating to Nelson Rockefeller, today she 
might do so by giving to Ted Cruz. Neither action is necessarily infused 
with much meaning; they both convey party loyalty—and, perhaps, 
nothing more.170 
                                                                                                                                
 169. This example is loosely based on Marietta Robinson, a product safety lawyer with 
a long career representing both plaintiffs and defendants. Robinson ran as a Democrat for 
a Michigan Supreme Court seat in 2000, served in several nonpartisan positions in the 
2000s, and was appointed by President Obama to a Democratic seat on the CPSC in 2013. 
 170. Cf. Václav Havel, The Power of the Powerless, in The Power of the Powerless 23, 
27 (John Keane ed., 1985). Amusingly, the Washington lawyer’s behavior is reminiscent of 
Havel’s classic description of shopkeepers in communist Czechoslovakia: 
I think it can safely be assumed that the overwhelming majority of shopkeepers 
never think about the slogans they put in their windows, nor do they use them to 
express their real opinions. That poster was delivered to our greengrocer from 
the enterprise headquarters along with the onions and carrots. He put them all 
into the window simply because it has been done that way for years, because 
everyone does it, and because that is the way it has to be. If he were to refuse, 
there could be trouble. 
Id. 
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We acknowledge that partisan sort among candidates may 
encourage donors interested solely in signaling their party loyalty to 
support more extreme candidates in 2014 than in 1979. But we caution 
that this theory’s explanatory power is limited. First, it cannot account for 
the fact that co-party and cross-party appointees differed markedly 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. That Democrats selected by President 
Carter exhibit sharply different donation activity than Democrats 
selected by President Reagan casts doubt on the notion that 
appointment-seekers’ ideal point estimates merely reflect the ideal points 
of their party’s candidates. 
Second, and somewhat to our surprise, we found that appointees to 
PBR agencies routinely make contributions to candidates from both 
political parties. Even among appointees to the high-profile, highly 
politicized FCC, a third of appointees in our dataset (eleven out of thirty-
three) donated to both Democratic and Republican candidates. If likely 
nominees are using campaign contributions solely to signal that they are 
on “Team Blue” or “Team Red,” the signals they are sending are 
remarkably noisy. 
Third, even with the trend toward polarized parties, donors who give 
exclusively to candidates from one party still have a wide variety of 
options from which to choose. In 1980, the mean Republican candidate 
on a general election ballot for state or federal office had a CFscore of 
0.770, while the mean Democratic candidate’s score was -0.365. (Recall 
that a higher CFscore indicates greater conservatism.) By 2014, those 
means were 1.046 and -0.985, respectively. But the standard deviations 
around these means also increased between 1980 and 2014: from 0.368 to 
0.573 for Republicans and from 0.529 to 0.668 for Democrats.171 In other 
words, party-loyal donors in 2014 could donate to a candidate who 
adopted the posture of a 1980-style Democrat (or 1980-style Republican) 
and who was still located within one standard deviation of the current 
party mean. That Democratic (Republican) appointees did not give to 
those more moderate candidates, and instead chose to give to more 
liberal (conservative) candidates, provides further support for the claim 
that appointees themselves have grown more extreme. 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
We can now say with some confidence that PBRs are more than 
paper tigers—that they do indeed lead Presidents to choose cross-party 
appointees with divergent ideological preferences. Our results have clear 
implications for the leading accounts of PBRs in the political science and 
administrative law literatures. Our results also suggest avenues for future 
                                                                                                                                
 171. See Adam Bonica, All Recipients, 1979–2014, Database on Ideology, Money in 
Politics, and Elections (DIME) (2015), http://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId= 
2865309&version=RELEASED&version=.2 [http://perma.cc/DKY4-HLEJ]. 
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research on the effects of PBRs. This last Part considers those 
implications and potential extensions of our project. 
A. The Monitoring Account 
One perspective on PBRs in the political science and administrative 
law literature emphasizes the relationship between PBRs and the cost of 
monitoring agency actions. PBRs can reduce monitoring costs for 
Congress in three ways. First, minority party commissioners are likely to 
sound a “fire alarm” if the majority on the commission embarks on a po-
tentially controversial course of action.172 These “fire alarms” make it eas-
ier for lawmakers to keep an eye on agencies: Instead of reviewing every 
agency action individually, Congress can focus on instances in which mi-
nority party members dissent from a commission decision.173 Second, 
beyond simply sounding an alarm, minority commissioners might further 
reduce the costs of congressional oversight by providing lawmakers with 
information about the consequences of agency actions as well as ways to 
overturn those actions.174 Third, and relatedly, the same fire alarms that 
alert Congress to questionable commission decisions also alert the 
courts.175 This third mechanism can be considered as part of a multi-
pronged strategy of congressional control: Congress creates agencies sub-
ject to PBRs, Congress also provides for judicial review of agency actions, 
and minority commissioners alert the courts to instances in which agency 
actions deviate from statutory directives. 
The monitoring account might lead us to expect that lawmakers 
would be most likely to impose PBRs when they are most worried about 
the executive branch straying from their own policy preferences. 
                                                                                                                                
 172. Barkow, supra note 87, at 41 (“[W]hen an agency is composed of members of 
different parties, it has a built-in monitoring system for interests on both sides . . . [and is] 
more likely to produce a dissent if the agency goes too far in one direction. That . . . serves 
as a ‘fire alarm’ that alerts Congress . . . .” (footnote omitted)). The origins of the “fire 
alarm” theory trace back to work by political scientists Mathew McCubbins and Thomas 
Schwartz. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 166 (1984). 
 173. Alexander Bolton, Collegial Leadership Structures, Ideological Diversity, and 
Policymaking in the United States 7 (Aug. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that ideological diversity and “minority votes can 
serve to reduce the oversight costs of principals, giving commission chairs incentives to 
moderate policies”). 
 174. Id. The presence of minority commissioners may also encourage majority 
commissioners to provide greater information than they otherwise would. Even the 
prospect of a dissent may serve an information-forcing function, compelling 
commissioners in the majority to provide more fulsome explanations for their decisions in 
an effort to dampen the potential dissenters’ fire alarm. Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, State 
Farm “with Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1589, 1605, 1657–60 (2014) (arguing that the prospect of inspector-general 
investigations, congressional hearings, or judicial review may compel agencies to provide 
better-reasoned explanations for their actions). 
 175. Bolton, supra note 173, at 13. 
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Consistent with this expectation, Professor David Lewis observes that the 
percentage of new agencies with appointment limitations such as PBRs is 
highest in periods of divided government.176 Note, though, that while 
Lewis’s finding is consistent with the monitoring account, it does not 
confirm that account. Even if opposing party lawmakers seek to reduce 
monitoring costs by imposing PBRs on new multimember agencies, their 
efforts may prove fruitless. 
What we can say is that certain empirical findings make the monitor-
ing account appear more plausible. For the monitoring account to be ac-
curate, a necessary but not sufficient condition is that PBRs actually lead 
to ideologically diverse agencies with minority members who will alert 
Congress and the courts if agency leaders stray from legislative 
preferences or statutory directives. In that respect, our finding that the 
ideological preferences of cross-party appointees in recent years have 
indeed diverged from the preferences of the appointing President 
supports the monitoring account’s claims. 
Importantly, however, the fact that PBRs produce ideological 
diversity in multimember agencies does not prove that PBRs succeed in 
reducing monitoring costs for Congress and the courts. First, members 
whose ideological preferences diverge from the White House occupant’s 
may still exhibit loyalty toward the President who appointed them. 
Professors Lee Epstein and Eric Posner have documented a powerful 
“loyalty effect” among Supreme Court Justices, who are more likely to 
vote with the Solicitor General when the President who appointed them 
remains in office.177 This loyalty effect is distinct from the phenomenon 
of Supreme Court Justices tending to support the administration when 
the President is of the same party as the Justice’s appointer; the loyalty 
effect is person-specific rather than party-specific. A similar loyalty effect 
among members of PBR agencies might lead a conservative Republican 
to support the policies of a Democratic President who appointed her 
(and likewise for a liberal Democrat appointed by a Republican 
President). A loyalty effect among cross-party appointees might 
undermine the monitoring value of ideological diversity at multimember 
agencies because minority party members might be reluctant to interfere 
with the agenda of a President to whom they feel gratitude. 
Second, even in the absence of a loyalty effect, agency members 
whose ideological preferences diverge from the President’s might do 
little to reduce monitoring costs for Congress and the courts. Minority 
party members might be excluded from access to information about 
agency decisionmaking, or they might be reluctant to blow the whistle on 
their majority party colleagues, or their “fire alarms” might go unheeded 
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by lawmakers and judges. Evaluating the strength of the monitoring 
account thus requires more than simply knowing how PBRs affect the 
ideological composition of multimember agencies. We would need to 
know whether the ideological composition of multimember agencies has 
observable effects on interactions between agencies and Congress, and 
between agencies and courts.178 
While the analysis above cannot answer all questions regarding the 
monitoring account’s accuracy, our topline results do provide guidance 
for researchers studying this subject. Most significantly, our findings sug-
gest that the effect of PBRs on monitoring costs may be time-variant: 
How PBRs affected interactions between agencies and Congress—and 
between agencies and courts—in the 1980s is not necessarily predictive 
with regard to later years. Our results suggest that the effects of PBRs on 
the ideological composition of multimember agencies from the Clinton 
presidency onward are quite unlike the effects under Presidents Carter, 
Reagan, and George H.W. Bush. Accordingly, the follow-on 
consequences for monitoring costs may be different for later periods 
than for earlier ones. 
B. The Deliberation Account 
A second account of PBRs (which is distinct from, but not 
inconsistent with, the monitoring account above) draws from the social 
psychology literature on group polarization. Group polarization occurs 
“when an initial tendency of individual group members toward a given 
direction is enhanced following group discussion.”179 Numerous studies 
have documented this phenomenon.180 Professor Cass Sunstein, who is 
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largely responsible for bringing the group polarization literature to the 
attention of administrative law scholars, highlights two explanations for 
the observed patterns of polarization. One emphasizes “social 
comparison”: People want to be perceived favorably by their peers, and 
so when surrounded by others with liberal (conservative) views, they seek 
favor by adjusting their own views to be more liberal (conservative).181 A 
second explanation stresses “limited argument pools”: Individuals are 
influenced by the arguments they encounter, and an individual 
confronted with only liberal (or only conservative) arguments is likely to 
move further in that direction.182 Both of these explanations might 
suggest that while individuals surrounded by others with like-minded 
views will grow more extreme, individuals exposed to a diversity of 
viewpoints may become more moderate.183 This diversity-leads-to-
depolarization hypothesis draws some support in the social psychology 
literature, though this effect is stronger for group members confronting 
a problem for the first time than for group members dealing with 
familiar and much-debated questions.184 
Sunstein argues that the social psychology literature on group polari-
zation and depolarization produces potentially useful insights for agency 
design. He writes: 
An independent agency that is all Democratic, or all 
Republican, might polarize toward an extreme position, likely 
more extreme than that of the median Democrat or 
Republican, and possibly more extreme than that of any 
member standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan member-
ship can operate as a check against movements of this kind.185 
The verbs “might” and “can” are important: Extrapolations from la-
boratory experiments to the real world of multimember federal agencies 
raise questions of external validity. Moreover, even in the absence of 
PBRs, agency commissioners may be exposed to a rich pool of arguments 
from sources other than their colleagues. Commissioners likely 
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encounter arguments from lawyers who practice before the agency, 
lobbyists who seek to influence agency action, think tanks inside the 
Beltway, and—on especially high-profile issues—news media. 
Nonetheless, the literature on group polarization offers a potential 
explanation as to how PBRs might affect agency decisionmaking. Here, 
as elsewhere, ideological diversity may depolarize.186 
Like the monitoring account, the deliberation account is difficult to 
verify directly. What can be said is that for the deliberation account to be 
accurate, it must first be the case that PBRs have the immediate effect of 
producing ideological diversity. In this respect, our findings are support-
ive of the deliberation account.187 Increasing party polarization appears 
to have the perhaps-unexpected effect of increasing the ideological 
heterogeneity of multimember agencies. No longer do Democratic 
Presidents fill seats on boards and commissions with like-minded liberals 
who differ only in their party registration. No longer do Republican 
Presidents stock multimember agencies with conservative Democrats and 
conservative Republicans. Instead, we observe PBRs leading to 
multimember agencies with a mix of liberal Democratic and conservative 
Republican members. 
That members are afforded opportunities to deliberate is a second 
necessary condition for the deliberation account. If decisions are 
preordained based on the views of the chair or those of an autonomous 
professional staff, with the multimember structure merely serving as a 
rubber stamp, then deliberation either will not occur or will be irrelevant 
to policy outcomes. Although the evidence is limited, it seems that this 
second condition is indeed met at most multimember agencies. 
Commissioners are generally able to hire their own dedicated staff, and 
thus have the capacity to critically evaluate proposals from the chair or 
others and to suggest informed alternatives.188 Moreover, most 
multimember agencies are required to undertake official action only at 
or after a formal meeting with a quorum, which affords at least an oppor-
tunity to deliberate.189 
But even assuming that these preconditions are met—namely, that 
PBRs foster ideological diversity and that members have opportunities to 
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deliberate—it does not necessarily follow that deliberation actually 
occurs, much less that minds are changed. The question of whether 
ideological diversity on multimember agencies has any effect on 
decisional outputs still remains unanswered. But while this Article does 
not seek to answer that question, it may be possible in future research to 
assess the deliberation account in further detail. For example, one might 
ask whether agencies that are more ideologically diverse are also less 
likely to be reversed by courts, or less likely to commit “infractions” of 
other kinds (that is, actions that elicit criticism from inspectors general, 
the Government Accountability Office, or major newspapers).190 One 
might also look at whether ideological diversity on multimember 
agencies affects voting patterns of individual agency members. 
Analogously, Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein have found 
evidence suggesting that on three-member circuit court panels, the 
presence of an ideological minority has a moderating effect on the votes 
of judges in the majority.191 Professor Richard Revesz has documented a 
similar phenomenon in environmental law cases decided by the D.C. 
Circuit.192 While these authors use party affiliation as a proxy for 
ideology, our approach of using appointees’ campaign contributions can 
allow for a richer analysis of ideological diversity and depolarization in 
the agency context. Down the road, we hope to examine whether 
ideological diversity leads agency members to gravitate together or pull 
apart. 
C. The Obstruction Account 
A third and final perspective on partisan balance requirements 
posits that PBRs unconstitutionally interfere with presidential control 
over the executive branch. The Justice Department under President 
George H.W. Bush made a brief argument to this effect in a 1989 Office 
of Legal Counsel memorandum: According to the memo, PBRs violate 
Article II’s Appointments Clause193 because “[t]he only congressional 
check that the Constitution places on the President’s power to appoint 
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‘principal officers’ is the advice and consent of the Senate.”194 The Office 
of Legal Counsel listed PBRs as one of “ten types of legislative provisions 
commonly included in proposed legislation that weaken the Presidency” 
and that the executive branch should “consistently and forcefully 
resist[].”195 
A more full-throated version of this argument emerges from recent 
work by Ronald Krotoszynski and coauthors. They rely on the Supreme 
Court’s 2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board,196 a case involving a five-member Board created to 
regulate auditing of securities issuers. While the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is not subject to a PBR, its mem-
bers were protected by “dual for-cause removal limitations”: They could 
be removed only by the SEC and only for cause, and the SEC 
commissioners could be removed by the President only for cause.197 The 
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, held that “the dual for-
cause limitations on the removal of Board members contravene the 
Constitution’s separation of powers.”198 But the opinion arguably stands 
for the broader proposition that the President must have “meaningful 
oversight and control powers over independent federal agencies.”199 
Krotoszynski and coauthors argue that PBRs, when coupled with for-
cause removal limitations for agency members, potentially violate the 
broader separation of powers principle embodied in the Free Enterprise 
Fund decision. They write: 
Statutory partisan balance requirements quite literally force 
Presidents to rely on political enemies to carry out their 
executive duties. . . . This is especially troubling considering the 
increased polarization present in American political parties. . . . 
Essentially, statutory partisan balance requirements foster a 
politically polarizing environment at the heads of independent 
agencies. . . . [T]hese statutory partisan balance requirements 
force Presidents to carry out their executive duties with con-
tentious and highly polarized agency heads. . . . [and] preclude 
a President from appointing a sufficient number of agency 
                                                                                                                                
 194. Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Auth., 13 Op. O.L.C. 
248, 250 (1989). 
 195. Id. at 248, 250. In a separate vein, law professor Jamin Raskin has argued that 
PBRs violate the First Amendment and the principle of equal protection because they 
discriminate on the basis of party affiliation. See Jamin B. Raskin, “A Complicated and 
Indirect Encroachment”: Is the Federal Election Commission Unconstitutionally 
Composed?, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 609, 623–26 (2000). 
 196. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 197. Id. at 486–87. The SEC’s organic statute actually imposes no limitation on the 
removal of commissioners. However, the parties in Free Enterprise Fund both agreed that 
SEC commissioners are protected by an unwritten for-cause removal limitation. See id. 
 198. Id. at 492. 
 199. Krotoszynski et al., supra note 15, at 948. 
80 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118:9 
 
commissioners in agreement with her political philosophy to 
overcome the debilitating effect of partisanship.200 
Notably, Krotoszynski and coauthors do not claim that PBRs are 
always unconstitutional. They write: 
If Congress requires the President to appoint political 
opponents to an independent federal agency, but does not also 
entrench such persons with a fixed term of office or good cause 
protection against removal, it is difficult to see how a partisan 
balance requirement on these facts would significantly impede 
the President’s ability to oversee and direct the agency’s 
operations.201 
In their view, it is the combination of PBRs and for-cause removal 
protections, rather than either of these provisions individually, that ren-
ders a large swath of administrative agencies unconstitutional. They con-
clude: “Congress should have the choice of mandating partisan balance 
requirements or insulating principal officers who serve on agency heads 
from removal; it should not be permitted to impose both conditions con-
currently . . . .”202 
There is, on reflection, something curious about the claim that for-
cause removal protections are constitutionally allowable but that the 
combination of PBRs and removal protections raises problems. Consider 
the case of the SEC, a five-member body whose commissioners serve 
staggered five-year terms, with one term ending in June of every year.203 
Suppose there were no PBR and so a two-term President (say, President 
Obama) would have opportunities to fill every position on the 
Commission. Assuming that President Obama could get all of his 
nominees confirmed, he would be able to stock the Commission with 
like-minded members during his eight years in office (indeed, by year 
five). President Trump would then inherit an SEC with five liberal 
Democratic commissioners. Each June, President Trump would be able 
to appoint a conservative Republican to the expiring term, but it would 
not be until June 2019—more than halfway through his first term—that 
he could achieve a conservative Republican majority on the SEC. 
At least arguably, partisan balance requirements make Presidents less 
“rel[iant] on political enemies” insofar as they ensure that Presidents in-
herit commissions with only a bare majority of members hailing from the 
opposite party. In the example above, President Trump would be able to 
achieve a conservative Republican majority on the SEC the first time that 
a Democratic-appointed commissioner’s term expires. In an analysis of 
twelve multimember agencies subject to PBRs, Professors Neil Devins and 
David Lewis find that following a change in party control of the White 
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House, it takes an average of thirteen to fourteen months for the new 
President to obtain a majority of co-partisans on a commission.204 In 
other words, if historical patterns hold, it will take President Trump an 
average of thirteen to fourteen months from inauguration—until March 
or April of 2018—before a majority of commissioners are Republican. By 
contrast, it takes an average of twenty-six months for a new President to 
appoint an absolute majority of members—until March of 2019 before a 
majority of commissioners are Trump appointees.205 
Thus, the extent to which PBRs make a President reliant on commis-
sioners whose ideologies differ from the President’s own views depends 
critically on whether PBRs actually push Democratic Presidents to 
appoint conservative Republicans (and, vice versa, whether PBRs actually 
push Republican Presidents to appoint liberal Democrats). If PBRs 
impose only a weak constraint, such that a Democratic President can 
appoint liberals to both Democratic and Republican seats, then it will 
take longer for a new conservative Republican President to fill a 
commission with conservatives. If PBRs impose a stronger constraint on 
ideology, then a new conservative Republican President will be able to 
assemble conservative majorities on commissions much more quickly. 
From this perspective, our results should be reassuring to those who 
worry that multimember agencies subject to PBRs whose members enjoy 
for-cause removal protection will interfere with the President’s pursuit of 
her policy agenda. As PBRs become increasingly effective at generating 
ideological diversity on multimember agencies, they may in fact do less 
rather than more to obstruct the sitting President. 
CONCLUSION 
Our topline result can be summarized in a single sentence: Since the 
mid-1990s (but not in the decade and a half before), partisan balance re-
quirements have shaped the ideological composition of multimember 
agencies by forcing Presidents to fill cross-party seats with appointees 
whose preferences diverge from their own. In other words, partisan bal-
ance requirements indeed bite, but they have come to do so only 
relatively recently. These findings are broadly consistent with supply-
side developments: As ideology and party identification have become 
more closely correlated, Presidents have found it more difficult to 
identify competent cross-party appointees whose policy preferences they 
share. And as a consequence, the decades-long trend toward partisan sort 
in American politics has led to multimember boards and commissions 
composed of very few cross-party appointees sharing the ideology of the 
President who appointed them. Democratic Presidents may still be on 
the hunt for liberal Republicans to appoint to cross-party seats (and 
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Republican Presidents for conservative Democrats), but with fewer of 
these creatures left in the wild, Presidents increasingly are compelled to 
select their ideological opponents for cross-party seats. 
Our results suggest a novel twist on the standard narrative of 
partisan polarization. The conventional wisdom holds that increased 
partisan polarization has strained the architecture of government. At 
agencies subject to PBRs, however, the effects of partisan sort may be 
salutary. Partisan sort may lead Presidents to select bona fide cross-party 
members, who in turn serve as in-house monitors and counterbalance 
tendencies that might drive groups to go to extremes. 
We cannot yet say definitively that PBRs reduce the costs borne by 
Congress and the courts in watching over multimember agencies. Nor 
can we confidently say that PBRs improve deliberative processes inside 
agencies. This study is a first step toward resolving those questions, but it 
is not a final answer. What we can conclude, based on the data analyzed 
here, is that PBRs appear to enhance the ideological diversity of 
multimember boards and commissions throughout the federal 
bureaucracy. At a time of heightened concerns regarding partisan 
polarization in Washington and across the country, that in itself is no 
mean feat. 
 
